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An Old Principle, A New Age
Michael Byers*
One of several meanings of the term "abuse of
rights" provides that there is an abuse of right when the
exploitation of an individual right injuriously affects
the interests of the community. The concept of abuse of
rights derives from national legal systems notwith-
standing that its content may vary among states. Abuse
of rights has influenced international law in areas
where it is widely considered to be a part of interna-
tional law, whether as a general principle of law or as
part of customary international law.
In examining these origins and the historical ap-
plications and contemporary limitations of abuse of
rights, the author contends that although it may not be
relevant to a number of areas of international law, abuse
of rights retains an important role with respect to vari-
ous international legal issues. These issues include the
resolution of certain types of normative conflicts, the
protection of "common spaces" and "matters of com-
mon concern", and the promotion of normative change.
Abuse of rights, the author demonstrates, may be a deft
instrument, and one not to be forgotten, in dealing with
issues such as transboundary pollution, declining fish-
stocks and whale populations, and the protection of ar-
eas such as the Antarctic and space.
Une des significations de l'expression <abus de
droib> pr6voit qu'il y a abus de droit si 'exploitation
d'un droit individuel a pour consquence d'entralner un
pr6judice A une communaut6. Bien que son contenu
puisse atre difftrent selon les 6tats, le concept d'abus de
droit provient de syst;mes juridiques nationaux. L'abus
de droit a influenc6 le droit international dans des r6-
gions ob le concept est compris comme faisant partie
du droit international, soit comme un principe g6n6ral
de droit, soit comme faisant partie du droit international
coutumier.
En examinant les origines, les applications histo-
riques et les limitations contemporaines de la notion
d'abus de droit, l'auteur soutient que, alors que le con-
cept n'est peut-4tre pas applicable A tous les domaines
du droit international, il conserve un r6le important en
ce qui conceme plusieurs questions juridiques intema-
tionales. Ces questions comprennent la rdsolution de
certains conflits normatifs, la protection des <espaces
communs>> et des <<questions d'intr& g6n~rab> et la
promotion des changements normatifs. L'auteur nous
d6montre que l'abus de droit peut 8tre un instrument
ing6nieux, qu'il ne faut pas oublier, particulirement
lorsque l'on doit traiter des questions telles que ]a pollu-
tion transnationale, le d6clin de ]a population des pois-
sons et des baleines et la protection de l'Antarctique et de
l'espace.
. Associate Professor, Duke University School of Law; Peter North Visiting Fellow, Centre for So-
cio-Legal Studies and Keble College, Oxford. The first version of this article was written for a semi-
nar in International Environmental Law at McGill University in 1990. 1 am grateful to Herbert Bern-
stein, Francesca Bignami, Jutta Brunn6e, James Crawford, Guy Goodwin-Gill, Donald Horowitz, and
Stephen Toope for helpful comments, and to Joseph Eckhardt (J.DLL.M., Duke University 2002)
and Hadley Ross (J.DJLLM., Duke University 2003) for excellent research assistance.
© McGill Law Journal 2002
Revue de droit de McGill 2002
To be cited as: (2002) 47 McGill LJ. 389
Mode de r6fdrence : (2002) 47 R.D. McGill 389
MCGILL LAW JOURNAL / REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL
Introduction
I. Abuse of Rights in National Legal Systems
A. Civil Law Systems
B. Common Law Systems
I1. Abuse of Rights as Applied in International Law
Ill. Abuse of Rights and Its Academic Supporters
IV. The Contemporary Relevance of Abuse of Rights
V. Abuse of Rights and Normative Conflicts
VI. Abuse of Rights, Common Spaces, and Matters of Common Concern
VII. Abuse of Rights and the Promotion of Normative Change
Conclusion
[Vol. 47
M. BYERS - ABUSE OF RIGHTS
In international law, abuse of rights refers to a State exercising
a right either in a way which impedes the enjoyment by other
States of their own rights or for an end different from that for
which the right was created, to the injury of another State ...'
Introduction
International lawyers trained in the common law tradition will have heard of, but
probably paid little attention to, the principle of abuse of rights (abus de droit).2 In an
age of limited sovereignty, abuse of rights seems a dated concept which is of little
contemporary interest or value. The principle retains little scope for application in
most areas of international law, areas that in recent decades have developed consid-
erably in both depth and specificity. Yet abuse of rights continues to play an important
role in those few areas where the rights of states are still conceived of as general or
primordial, by mediating between or otherwise limiting the exercise of rights. This
article examines the origins, historical applications, and contemporary limitations of
abuse of rights before demonstrating how the principle remains relevant in resolving
certain kinds of normative conflicts, protecting "common spaces" and "matters of
common concern", and promoting normative change.
I. Abuse of Rights in National Legal Systems
The historical influence of abuse of rights in international law derives substan-
tially from the principle's existence in a large number of national legal systems.' It has
' A. Kiss, "Abuse of Rights" in R. Bernhardt, ed., Encyclopedia of Public International Law, vol. 1
(Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1992) at 4 [hereinafter Kiss, "Abuse of Rights"].2 See H. Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International Community (Hamden, Conn.: Ar-
chon Books, 1966) at 286 [hereinafter Lauterpacht, Function of Law]: 'The essence of the doctrine is
that, as legal rights are conferred by the community, the latter cannot countenance their anti-social use
by individuals; that the exercise of a hitherto legal right becomes unlawful when it degenerates into an
abuse of rights; and that there is such an abuse of rights each time the general interest of the commu-
nity is injuriously affected as the result of the sacrifice of an important social or individual interest to a
less important, though hitherto legally recognized, individual right" A Council of Europe study de-
fined abuse of rights as a "legal mechanism designed to ease the inflexibility of the legal relationships
derived from statutory, judicial or treaty rules" See J. Voyame, B. Cottier & B. Rocha, "Abuse of
Right in Comparative Law" in Abuse of Rights and Equivalent Concepts: The Principle and Its Pres-
ent Day Application (Proceedings of the 19V Colloquy on European Law, Luxembourg, 6-9 November
1989) (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 1990) 23 at 23 [hereinafter Abuse of Rights and Equivalent
Concepts].
' The origins of the principle would, however, seem to lie in Roman law. See Kiss, "Abuse of
Rights", supra note 1 at 5; J. Willisch, State Responsibility for Technological Damage in International
Law (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1987) at 180-81. See also A. Rodger, Owners and Neighbours in
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long been accepted that general principles common to most national legal systems
constitute a primary source of international law, albeit one that provides considerably
fewer rules than treaties or customary international law.' However, the content and
application of the principle of abuse of rights vary significantly among national legal
systems, making it difficult to identify a common principle except in the most general
of terms.
A. Civil Law Systems
In some systems, abuse of rights is given a wide compass. For example, article 2
of the litre priliminaire to the Swiss Civil Code states: "Chacun est tenu d'exercer
ses droits et d'extcuter ses obligations selon les rbgles de la bonne foi. L'abus mani-
feste d'un droit n'est pas prottg6 par la loi."5 And in France, the courts have inter-
preted articles 1382 and 1383 of the Code civil, which fix responsibility on the author
of any harm, so as to limit the abusive exercise of rights or powers in property law, la-
bour law, contractual obligations, and legal proceedings.'
Roman Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972); D. Johnston, Roman Law in Context (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1999) at 71-76; P.G. Stein, "'Equitable' Remedies for the Protection of
Property" in P. Birks, ed., New Perspectives in the Roman Law of Property: Essays for Bany Nicholas
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989) 185.
4See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(c), online: International Court of Justice
<http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictextibasicstatute.htu> (date accessed: 6 May
2002), which reads: "The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such
disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: ... (c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations"; B. Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals
(London: Stevens & Sons, 1953); A. Pellet, Recherches sur les principes giniraux de droit en droit
international (Thesis, Universit6 de Paris, 1974); G. Battaglini, "11 riconoscimento internazionale dei
principi generali del diritto" in Le droit international b l'heure de sa codification: 6tudes en l'honneur
de Roberto Ago, vol. 1 (Milan: Giuffr6, 1987) 97.
' G. Scyboz & P.-R. Gilli~ron, Code civil suisse et Code des obligations annotis (Lausanne: ELi-
tions Payot, 1999). When Turkey adopted the main provisions of the Swiss Civil Code in 1926, this
included article 2, although the Turkish version emphasizes that there is an abuse of rights only "if the
abuse harms another person." See M. Zwahlen, "Les 6carts 16gislatifs entre le droit civil turc et le droit
civil suisse" [1973] Revue de droit suisse 141.
6Art. 1382 C. civ. reads: "Tout fait quelconque de l'homme, qui cause A autrui un dommage, oblige
celui par la faute duquel il est arriv6, h le rparer." Art. 1383 C. civ. reads: "Chacun est responsable du
dommage qu'il a caus6 non seulement par son fait, mais encore par sa negligence ou par son impru-
dence?' See L. Josserand, De l'abus des droits (Paris: Rousseau, 1905); L. Josserand, De l'esprit des
droits et de leur relativit, 2d ed. (Paris: Dalloz, 1939); H.C. Gutteridge, "Abuse of Rights" (1935) 5
Cambridge L.J. 22 at 31-35; P. Catala & J.A. Weir, "Delict and Torts: A Study in Parallel, Part If'
(1964) 38 Tul. L. Rev. 221 at 221-36; V. Bolgdr, "Abuse of Rights in France, Germany, and Switzer-
land: A Survey of a Recent Chapter in Legal Doctrine" (1975) 35 La. L. Rev. 1015 at 1015-23. A
well-known application of abuse of rights in France is the Affaire Cldment-Bayard, where the Cour de
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Some national legal systems, while giving the principle of abuse of rights broad
effect, have linked it to social or economic interests. For example, the Soviet Code of
1923 was prefaced by the following clause paramount: "Civil rights are protected by
the law except in those cases in which they are exercised in a sense contrary to their
economic and social purpose.' ' Similarly, article 7 of the Czechoslovak Civil Code of
1964 stated that no one was allowed to misuse his or her rights against the interests of
society.' And in the 1972 case of Mitamura v. Suzuki, the Japanese Supreme Court ar-
ticulated a reasonableness element to abuse of rights, with reasonableness being cast
in terms of social interests:
In all cases a right must be exercised in such a fashion that the result of the
exercise remains within a scope judged reasonable in the light of the prevailing
social conscience. When a conduct by one who purports to have a right to do so
fails to show reasonableness and when the consequential damages to others ex-
ceed the limit which is generally supposed to be borne in the social life, we
must say that the exercise of the right is no longer within its permissible scope.
Thus, the person who exercises his right in such a fashion shall be held liable
because his conduct constitutes an abuse of right.9
In other national legal systems the principle of abuse of rights is narrowly con-
ceived. For example, article 226 (the famous Schikaneverbot) of the German Civil
Code states: "The exercise of a right is unlawful, if its purpose can only be to cause
damage to another."'" An element of intent is also part of the principle as it appears in
article 833 of the Italian Civil Code, which forbids the exercise of property rights
Cassation enjoined the construction of a large wooden structure topped with spikes that had been de-
signed to prevent the use of a nearby airport, despite the landowner's right under Art. 552 C. civ. to
plant or build whatever he wished on his property. See Cass. Req., 3 August 1915, D.P. 1917.1.79. See
also Trib. civ. Compi6gne, 19 February 1913, D.P. 1913.11.177 at 181 for the Tribunal's decision (to
similar effect) in the same case.
7 See V.E. Greaves, "The Social-Economic Purpose of Private Rights: Section 1 of the Soviet Civil
Code. A Comparative Study of Soviet and Non-communist Law" (1934) 12 N.YU. L. Rev. 165;
Gutteridge, ibid at 41-42. Article 5 of the 1964 Civil Code of the Russian Federation was to similar
effect. See V. Paul, 'The Abuse of Rights and Bona Fides in International Law" (1977) 28 Oster-
reichische Zeitschrift fdr 6ffentliches Recht und V61kerrecht 107 at 119.
'See Paul, ibid at 119.
26 Saiko Saibansho minji hanreishu. 1067 (Sup. Ct., 27 June 1972), translated in K. Sono & Y.
Fujioka, "The Role of the Abuse of Right Doctrine in Japan" (1975) 35 La. L. Rev. 1037 at 1037
[emphasis in original].
,' The Gennan Civil Code, trans. S. Goren (Littleton, Colo.: Fred B. Rothman, 1994). Although the
Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch never uses the term Rechtsmiflbrauch, the principle of abuse of rights is an
important part of German law. See generally Gutteridge, supra note 6 at 36-39; G. E6rsi, "Rechts-
miBbrauch und funktionsmliBige Rechtsausilbung im Westen und Osten" (1965) 6 Zeitschrift ffir
Rechtsvergleichung 30; Bolgdr, supra note 6 at 1023-30; G.P Fletcher, 'The Right and the Reason-
able" (1985) 98 Harv. L. Rev. 949.
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purely for the purpose of harming others," and in article 1295(2) of the Austrian Civil
Code, which is framed in similar terms.'2
In other jurisdictions, the element of intent has explicitly been rejected. For ex-
ample, in Morse v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., the Supreme Court of Louisiana held:
'The exercise of a right [...] without legitimate and serious interest, even where there
is neither alleged nor proved an intent to harm, constitutes an abuse of right which
courts should not countenance."' 3
Some national legal systems have combined several of these different elements.
For example, article 7 of the Spanish Civil Code provides that an abuse of right may
result from a deliberate intention, the aim pursued, or the circumstances of the harm
caused." Similarly, article 13(2) of the 1992 Civil Code of the Netherlands reads:
" 'he owner cannot perform acts that have no other purpose than that of harming or causing an-
noyance to others." The Italian Civil Code, trans. M. Beltramo, G.E. Longo & J.H. Merryman (Dobbs
Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, 1991). Italian courts, however, have held that article 833 is inopera-
tive if the property owner derives any advantage from the exercise of a right. See e.g. Cass. civ., 7
March 1986, No. 1509, in Giust. civ., 1986, I, 434; Cass. civ., 29 July 1963, No. 2139 in Giust. civ.,
1963, II; Cass. civ., 23 February 1963, No. 448 in Giust. civ., 1963,1, 1053. See generally A. di Fran-
cia, "L'abuso di diritto nella legislazione, nella dottrina e nella giurisprudenza italiana" in M. Rotondi,
ed., L'abus de droit (Padua: CEDAM, 1979) 115.
," 'A person who intentionally injures another in a manner in violation of public morals is liable
therefor; however, if the injury was caused in the exercise of legal rights, the person causing it shall be
liable therefor only when the exercise of this right obviously has the purpose to cause damage to the
other." The General Civil Code of Austria, trans. PL. Baeck (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y: Oceana Publications,
1972). See also T. Mayer-Maly & H. B6hm, "Die Behandlung des Rechtsmissbrauchs im Oster-
reichischen Privatrecht," in Rotondi, ed., ibid. at 221.
'" 344 So.2d 1353 at 1369 (La. 1977) (on rehearing). See also Hero Lands Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 310
So.2d 93 at 99 (La. 1975). On abuse of rights in Louisiana, see generally A.N. Yiannopoulos, "Civil
Liability for Abuse of Right: Something Old, Something New..." (1994) 54 La. L. Rev. 1173; A.N.
Yiannopoulos, "Abuse of Right in Louisiana Civil Law" in A.M. Rabello, ed., Aequitas and Equity:
Equity in Civil Law and Mixed Jurisdictions (Jerusalem: Harry & Michael Sacher Institute for Legis-
lative Research and Comparative Law, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1997) 690.
'The article reads:
7.1 Rights must be exercised in accordance with the requirements of good faith.
.2 The law does not protect abuse of rights or the antisocial exercise of rights. Every act
or omission that, by virtue of the intention of the actor, the object thereof, or the cir-
cumstances in which it is undertaken manifestly surpasses the normal limits of exercise
of a right, causing damage to a third party, shall give rise to liability in damages and to
the adoption of judicial or administrative measures that will prevent persistence in the
abuse.
Civil Code of Spain, trans. J. Romanach, Jr. (Baton Rouge, La.: Lawrence, 1994). See also FE de
Villavicencio, "El abuso del derecho en la doctrina y en lajurisprudencia espafiolas" in Rotondi, ed.,
supra note 11 at 75. See also article 6(1) of the 1987 Civil Code of Luxembourg: "Any deliberate act
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Instances of abuse of right are the exercise of a right with the sole intention of
harming another or for a purpose other than that for which it was granted; or
the exercise of a right where its holder could not reasonably have decided to
exercise it, given the disproportion between the interest to exercise the right and
the harm caused thereby. 5
As this brief review makes clear, even if abuse of rights means somewhat differ-
ent things in different civil law systems, it remains an enduring element of the civil
law.'6
B. Common Law Systems
The principle of abuse of rights is not so readily apparent in common law sys-
tems, yet some authors argue that it is the basis upon which tort law developed. Jo-
seph Perillo has claimed that abuse of rights exists in United States law, where it is
"employed under such labels as nuisance, duress, good faith, economic waste, public
policy, misuse of copyright and patent rights, lack of business purpose in tax law, ex-
tortion, and others."'" In Australia, John Fleming holds the view that the tort of abuse
which manifestly exceeds, by its purpose or by the circumstances in which it is carried out, the nor-
mal exercise of a right, shall not be protected by the law, shall incur the liability of the person respon-
sible and may constitute grounds for action to restrain him from persisting in the said abuse:' Trans-
lated in G. Margue, 'Abuse of Rights and Luxembourg Law" in Abuse of Rights and Equivalent Con-
cepts, supra note 2,56.
"s New Netherlands Civil Code: Patrimonial Law (Property, Obligations and Special Contracts),
trans. P.P.C. Haanappel & E. MacKaay (Deventer Kluwer Law and Taxation, 1990) [hereinafter New
Netherlands Civil Code]. Prior to the adoption of the new code in 1992, the Dutch courts had long
applied abuse of rights. See CJ.H. Brunner, "Abuse of Rights in Dutch Law" (1977) 37 La. L. Rev.
729. See also Civil Code of Quebec, art. 7: "No right may be exercised with the intent of injuring an-
other or in an excessive and unreasonable manner which is contrary to the requirements of good
faith" Prior to 1994, the principle of abuse of rights had long been applied in Quebec. See P.B.
Mignault, '_abus des droits" (1939-40) 3 U.T.L.J. 360 at 365. For the similarly multifaceted provi-
sions of the Mexican Civil Code, see C6digo Civil para el Distrito Federal en Materia Comtin ypara
toda la Repablica en Materia Federal (Mexico City: tdiciones Delma, 1995) arts. 840, 1912.
16 As Joseph Voyame, Bertil Cottier, and Bolivar Rocha write at the conclusion of a Council of
Europe study in 1990: "Abuse of rights is an institution which can be expected to endure. Its origin
lies in the Roman rules forbidding acts of nuisance, but it has developed over the centuries into a car-
dinal principle of private law. Moreover, in those European countries which place this institution at the
centre of their legal system, voices are no longer raised to demand its abolition, or even simply to cast
doubt on its necessity. On the contrary, the great majority of commentators agree on the usefulness of
the remedial function of the rules forbidding abuse of rights. Indeed, the legislator is no more infalli-
ble today than he was in the past. While the rules he promulgates are becoming increasingly precise
and detailed, he cannot foresee every eventuality. Only the proscription of abuse of rights makes it
possible to establish the connection between the justice ostensibly guaranteed by positive law and
genuine justice." Voyame, Cottier & Rocha, supra note 2 at 48.
" J.M. Perillo, "Abuse of Rights: A Pervasive Legal Concept" (1995) 27 Pac. LJ. 37 at 40.
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of process is "probably the clearest illustration in our law of what civilians call an
'abuse of right' .'" But note that, from this perspective, the principle of abuse of rights
as such is not directly employed; it instead serves as a matrix from which more spe-
cific legal principles grow.
Some common law cases call even this limited role into question. For example, in
the 1895 case of Mayor of Bradford v. Pickles, Lord Halsbury famously stated: "If it
was a lawful act, however ill the motive, he had a right to do it."" However, as Pierre
Catala and Tony Weir have explained:
A doctrine of abuse of rights is necessary only if the rights are proclaimed in
generous terms; if they are initially hedged with qualifications, it may not be
required at all. The former is the French legislative method; the latter is peculiar
to the common-law tradition of England, which affects the style of legislation
as well as its construction. If a right arises at common law, the authority for it
will be a judicial decision in typically narrow terms, obiter and unauthoritative
in so far as it goes beyond the facts under review; English statutes also make
every effort to avoid appearing to grant a broadly stated right, and even when a
right is indubitably conferred, the judges are there to state that the legislature
has at the same time impliedly restricted it.z'
Indeed, a closer examination of the decision reveals that the motive for the defendant's
actions was, in fact, monetary gain, which has enabled Catala and Weir and others to
distinguish the case from the typical abuse of rights situation.'
Other common law nuisance cases provide some support for an underlying prin-
ciple of abuse of rights. For example, in Hollywood Silver Fox Farm v. Emmett, an-
other English court considered the utility of the defendant's conduct before holding
that the firing of guns on his property with the sole aim of frightening his neighbour's
foxes constituted a tort.' Similarly, William Prosser wrote of American law that "[i]n
all but a few jurisdictions, it is now settled that where the defendant acts out of pure
malice or spite, as by erecting a fence for the sole purpose of shutting off the plain-
tiff's view, or drilling a well to cut off the plaintiff's underground water [...] such con-
duct is indefensible from a social point of view, and there is liability for nuisance."'
Regardless of the label used, it appears that the same general principle is at work.
As Hersch Lauterpacht explained: "The law of torts as crystallized in various systems
,8J.G. Fleming, The Law of Torts, 8th ed. (Sydney: The Law Book Company, 1992) at 623.
"[1895] A.C. 587 at 594 (H.L.), aff'g [1895] 1 Ch. 145 (C.A.). See also Allen v. Flood, [1898]
A.C. 1 (H.L.).
'0 Supra note 6 at 237-38.
21 See ibid at 247; W. Friedmann, "Social Security and Some Recent Developments in the Common
Law" (1943) 21 Can. Bar Rev. 369 at 372-73.
12 [1936] 2 K.B. 468. See also Christie v. Davey, [1893] 1 Ch. 316.
2' W.L. Prosser, Law of Torts, 3d ed. (St. Paul, Minn.: West, 1964) at 618-19.
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of law in judicial decisions or legislative enactment is to a large extent a list of wrongs
arising out of what society considers to be an abuse of rights."' Yet this general prin-
ciple is impossible to define in precise terms such that it would encompass all of its
various manifestations. A definition such as 'The excessive or abusive exercise of
rights as limited by the rights and interests of others" is about the best that one can do.
Moreover, the above review suggests that abuse of rights is of limited utility in those
legal systems and those areas of law in which the rights themselves have been framed
in precise or qualified terms.
II. Abuse of Rights as Applied in International Law
As a result, due largely to its widespread existence in national legal systems,
many states, judges, arbiters, and authors have considered abuse of rights to be part of
international law, whether as a general principle of law or as part of customary inter-
national law.'
A number of states have argued for the applicability of abuse of rights in state-to-
state litigation and arbitration, including the United Kingdom in the Fisheries Juris-
diction Cases,"6 Liechtenstein in the Nottebohm Case, Norway in the Norwegian
Loans Case," Liberia and Ethiopia in the South West Africa Cases, Belgium in the
Barcelona Traction Case,"° and Australia in the Nuclear Tests Case." Greece made an
2 Lauterpacht, Function of Law, supra note 2 at 297.
's See generally M. Whiteman, Digest ofInternational Law, vol. 5 (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1965) at 224-30; Kiss, 'Abuse of Rights", supra note 1 at 4-8.26 (United Kingdom v. Iceland), "Memorial of the Merits of the Dispute Submitted by the Govern-
ment of the United Kingdom" (14 April 1972), [1975] I.CJ. Pleadings (Vol. 1) 265 at paras. 153-54.
The UK argued that the right to delimit exclusive fisheries zones is balanced by the duty to respect the
rights of other states. To ground the point, the memorial quoted Alvarez J.'s separate opinion in the
Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway), [1951] I.CJ. Rep. 116 at 150-51 [hereinafter Fisheries
Case], where he wrote, inter alia, that states demarcating their territorial seas must do so in a way that
does not constitute an abuse of rights.
(Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), "Memorial Submitted by the Government of the Principality of
Liechtenstein" (26 January 1952), [1955] I.CJ. Pleadings (Vol. 1) 21 at para. 51 [hereinafter Notte-
bohm Case]. See below, text accompanying note 144.
Case of Certain Norwegian Loans (France v. Norway), [1957] I.C.J. Rep. 9 at 73, Basdevant J.
[hereinafter Norwegian Loans Case]. Norway argued that the Court should assert jurisdiction when-
ever claims as to the applicability of a domestic jurisdiction reservation constitute an abuse of rights.
2' (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa) (Second Phase), [1966] I.CJ. Rep. 6 at 10,
480-83. Liberia and Ethiopia argued that South Africa had, without obtaining the consent of the
United Nations, "substantially modified the terms" of the agreement to manage the territory that
would later become Namibia, and that this constituted an abuse of rights.
3' Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain)
(Second Phase), [1970] I.CJ. Rep. (Vol. 1) 3 at 17 [hereinafter Barcelona Traction Case]. Under the
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abuse of rights argument in The Ambatielos Claim,32 as did Nauru in the Nauru Case"
and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the Genocide Case.'
Some treaties contain provisions that expressly relate to abuse of rights. For ex-
ample, article 300 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
reads:
States Parties shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed under this Con-
vention and shall exercise the rights, jurisdiction and freedoms recognized in
this Convention in a manner which would not constitute an abuse of right.'
heading "Abuse of Rights, Arbitrary and Discriminatory Attitude of Certain Administrative Authori-
ties:' Belgium argued that Spain had frustrated the implementation of an agreement and "made im-
proper use of an international enquiry."
3" Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France), [1974] I.C.J. Rep. 253 at 362. Australia argued that, in
the event that France was determined to have a right to conduct atmospheric nuclear tests, its exercise
of that right would have constituted an abuse of rights.
32 (Greece, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland) (1956), 12 R.I.A.A. 83 at 94
(Commission of Arbitration, Arbitrators: R.J. Alfaro et aL). Greece argued that the withholding of
evidence by the British government in national court proceedings in England constituted "an abuse of
right which amounted to a denial of justice."
33 Memorial of the Republic of Nauru, Part 1Il, Chapter 5, 163 ("Abuse of Rights and Acts of Mal-
administration"), online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.orglicjwwwficasesfmaus/
inausframe.htm> (date accessed: 6 May 2002); Case Concerning Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru
(Preliminary Objections), [1992] I.C.J. Rep. 240 at 244. Nauru argued that Australia exercised its
powers of administration over that island nation, particularly with regard to the extraction of phos-
phates, in a manner that amounted to an abuse of rights.
Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide (Provisional Measures), Order of 13 September 1993, [1993] I.C.J. Rep. 325 at par. 19.
The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia argued that Bosnia-Herzegovina's request for provisional meas-
ures constituted an abuse of rights.
31 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/122,
21 I.L.M. 1261, online: United Nations <http://www.un.orglDepts/los/convention agreements/texts/
unclos/closindx.htm> (date accessed: 6 May 2002) [hereinafter UNCLOS cited to I.L.M.]. When Presi-
dent Clinton transmitted UNCLOS to the United States Senate in 1995 for its advice and consent to rati-
fication, he explained, 'This article restates existing customary law." See United States: President's
Transmittal of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Agreement relating to the
Implementation of Part XI to the U.S. Senate with Commentary, 7 October 1994, 34 I.L.M. 1393 at
1446. Art. 34 of the United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish
Stocks: Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 4 December 1995, UN GA, 6th Sess., UN Doc.
A/CONF.164/37 (1995), 34 I.L.M. 1542, reads: "States Parties shall fulfil in good faith the obligations
assumed under this Agreement and shall exercise the rights recognized in this Agreement in a manner
which would not constitute an abuse of right." Additionally, subsequent to the coming into force of the
amending Protocol No. 11 in 1998, art. 17 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, Eur. T.S. 5, now carries the heading
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The principle also appears in the case law of the International Court of Justice
("ICJ") and the Permanent Court of International Justice ("PCIJ"). In the Case con-
cerning certain German interests in Polish Upper Silesia (The Merits), the PCIJ held:
Germany undoubtedly retained until the actual transfer of sovereignty the right
to dispose of her property, and only a misuse of this right could endow an act of
alienation with the character of a breach of the Treaty; such misuse cannot be
presumed, and it rests with the party who states that there has been such misuse
to prove his statement.'
In the Case of the Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex, the same court
suggested that if a state attempted to avoid its contractual obligations by resorting to
measures having the same effect as the specifically prohibited acts, an abuse of rights
would result? And the ICJ, when dealing with the right to draw straight baselines in a
territorial sea delimitation in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, wrote:
The base-line has been challenged on the ground that it does not respect the
general direction of the coast. It should be observed that, however justified the
rule in question may be, it is devoid of any mathematical precision. In order
properly to apply the rule, regard must be had for the relation between the de-
viation complained of and what, according to the terms of the rule, must be re-
garded as the general direction of the coast. Therefore, one cannot confine one-
self to examining one sector of the coast alone, except in a case of manifest
abuse; nor can one rely on the impression that may be gathered from a large
scale chart of this sector alone.j
"Prohibition of abuse of rights." Art. 17 itself reads: "Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as
implying for any State, group or person any tight to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at
the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent
than is provided for in the Convention " Art. 35(3) on "Admissibility Criteria" states: 'The Court shall
declare inadmissible any individual application submitted under Art. 34 which it considers incompati-
ble with the provisions of the Convention or the protocols thereto, manifestly ill-founded, or an abuse of
the right of application" For other treaty provisions on abuse of rights, see Convention on Rights and
Duties of States, 26 December 1933, 165 L.N.T.S. 19 at art. 3 ("Montevideo Convention"); Convention
on the High Seas, 29 April 1958,450 U.N.T.S. 11, 13 U.S.T. 2312 at art. 2.
" (Germany v. Poland) (1926), PC.IJ. (Ser. A) No. 7 at 30. The decision concerned Germany's
powers in Upper Silesia during the period between the coming into force of the Treaty of Versailles
and the transfer of sovereignty to Poland.
(France v. Switzerland) (1932), P.C.IJ. (Ser. A/B) No. 46 at 167. The court wrote: 'A reservation
must be made as regards the case of abuses of a right, since it is certain that France must not evade the
obligation to maintain the zones by erecting a customs barrier under the guise of a control cordon. But
an abuse cannot be presumed by the Court." See also the Order of 6 December 1930 in the same case:
(1930), P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 24 at 12.
. Fisheries Case, supra note 26 at 141-42 [second emphasis added].
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The principle has also received support in separate and dissenting opinions. For
example, in Voting Procedure on Questions relating to Reports and Petitions con-
cerning the Territory of South-West Africa, Judge Hersch Lauterpacht wrote:
[A]n Administering State which consistently sets itself above the solemnly and
repeatedly expressed judgment of the Organization [i.e. the United Nations], in
particular in proportion as that judgement approximates to unanimity, may find
that it has overstepped the imperceptible line between impropriety and illegal-
ity, between discretion and arbitrariness, between the exercise of the legal right
to disregard the recommendation and the abuse of that right, and that it has ex-
posed itself to consequences legitimately following as a legal sanction.!
More recently, Judge Weeramantry referred to abuse of rights as a "well-established
area of international law" when discussing sustainable development in the Gabctlcovo-
Nagymaros Case, where Slovakia's treaty rights were pitted against Hungary's
environmental concerns.' Judge Parra-Aranguren, in the same case, held that
"Slovakia shall not compensate Hungary ... unless a manifest abuse of rights on its
part is clearly evidenced."' And, although the ICJ itself has never endorsed the
principle unequivocally, neither it, nor any of its members, has ever rejected the place
of abuse of rights in international law.
Some additional support for the principle may be found in international arbitral
decisions. For instance, the tribunal in the 1986 La Bretagne Arbitration held that
treaty rights could not be exercised in an abusive manner:
" Advisory Opinion, [1955] I.C.J. Rep. 67 at 120 (separate opinion).
40 Case Concerning the Gabcifkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), [1997] I.C.J. Rep. 7
at para. 22 [hereinafter Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Case]. Weeramantry J. also refers to abuse of rights in
the Case concerning Maritime Delimitation in the Area Between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Den-
mark v. Norway), [1993] I.C.J. Rep. 38 at par. 110, where he cites with approval Schachter's analysis
on the five uses of equity. Schachter identifies one use as offering "certain specific principles of legal
reasoning associated with fairness and reasonableness, to wit, estoppel, unjust enrichment and abuse
of rights." See 0. Schachter, "International Law in Theory and Practice: General Course in Public In-
ternational Law" (1982) 178 Rec. des Cours 1 at 82, reprinted as International Law in Theory and
Practice (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1991) at 56 [hereinafter Schachter, International Law].
41 Gabctfcovo-Nagymaros Case, ibid. 227 at para. 22. See also Conditions ofAdmission of a State to
Membership in the United Nations (Article 4 of the Charter), [1948] I.C.J. Rep. 73 at 80, 93 [herein-
after Admission Case]; The Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania) (Merits), [1949] I.CJ.
Rep. 4 at 47-48, 75, 129 [hereinafter Corfu Channel Case]; Competence of the General Assembly for
the Admission of a State to the United Nations, [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 4 at 15; Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case
(United Kingdom v. Iran), [1952] I.C.J. Rep. 93 at 133 [hereinafter Anglo-Iranian Oil Case]; Fisher-
ies Case, supra note 26 at 150, 152, 153; The Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria (Preliminary
Objections) (Belgium v. Bulgaria) (1939), PC.I.J. (Ser. A/B) No. 77 at 88; Nottebohm Case, supra note
27 at 37; Norwegian Loans Case, supra note 28; South West Africa Cases, supra note 29 at 480-83.
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[A] voisinage arrangement of the type set forth in Article 4 of the Agreement
involves, for the benefit of the Contracting Parties, recognition of rights that
may be exercised concurrently in the same geographical sector, and by virtue
of that fact, requires restraint and moderation from the holders of these rights in
exercising them and in co-operating in the settlement of any disputes arising
out of their exercise.42
Most recently, the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization ("WTO") relied
on abuse of rights in the 1998 Shrimp-Turtle Case. 3 In applying article XX of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade' ("GATT') to the United States' claim that
its efforts to change foreign fishing practices fell within the article XX(g) exception
"relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources," it wrote:
The chapeau of Article XX is, in fact, but one expression of the principle of
good faith. This principle, at once a general principle of law and a general prin-
ciple of international law, controls the exercise of rights by states. One applica-
tion of this general principle, the application widely known as the doctrine of
abus de droit, prohibits the abusive exercise of a state's rights and enjoins that
whenever the assertion of a right "impinges on the field covered by [a] treaty
obligation, it must be exercised bona fide, that is to say, reasonably." An abu-
sive exercise by a Member of its own treaty right thus results in a breach of the
treaty rights of the other Members and, as well, a violation of the treaty obliga-
tion of the Member so acting.4'
Abuse of rights also found some support when, in 1920, the Advisory Committee
of Jurists was crafting article 38 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of Interna-
" (Canada v. France) (1986), 82 I.L.R. 590 at para. 28 (Arbitral Tribunal, Arbitrators: De Visscher,
Pharand, Qu~neudee). The tribunal was referring to the Agreement of 27 March 1972 between Can-
ada and France on their mutual fishing relations. For the full text of the agreement, see 82 LL.R. 590
at 600. For other arbitral decisions concerning abuse of rights, see North American Dredging Co. of
Texas Case, opinion rendered 31 March 1926, General Claims Commission (U.S.-Mexico), Opinion
of Commissioners 1927, 21 at 23; Trail Smelter Case (United States v. Canada) (1938-41), 3 R.I.A.A.
1905 (Arbitrators: C. Warren, R.A.E. Greenshields, J.E Hostie) [hereinafter Trail Smelter Case];
Boffolo Case, in J. Ralston, ed., Venezuelan Arbitrations of 1903 (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1904) 696 at 705; In the Claim of Walter Fletcher Smith v. The Compaiiia Urbani-
zadora del Parque y Playa de Marianao (Cuba v. United States) (1929), 2 R.I.A.A. 915. In addition, a
German national court has held that the principle of proportionality exists in international law as part
of the general principle of abuse of rights. See Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr-
und Vorratsstellefiir Getreide und Futtermittel (1972), 11 C.M.L.R. 177 at 186.
," United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (Complaint by the
United States) (1998), WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (Appellate Body Report), online: WTO
<http://vww.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu e/dispu status_e.htm#1998> (date accessed: 6 May 2002)
[footnote omitted, hereinafter Shrimp-Turtle Case].
4 30 October 1947,58 U.N.T.S. 187, Can. T.S. 1947 No. 27.
41 Supra note 43 at para. 158. The Appellate Body was quoting from Cheng, supra note 4 at 125.
For a further discussion of this case, see below, Part V.
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tional Justice, which identifies sources of international law and which later became
article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.' Arturo Ricci-Busatti,
the Italian member of the Committee, referred to the principle "which forbids the
abuse of rights" as one of the "general principles of law"." He gave as an example
disputes concerning the right of a coastal state to fix the breadth of its territorial sea.
Assuming that there was, at that time, no international rule defining the outer limit of
the territorial sea, he suggested that the court be permitted to admit the rules of each
state in this respect as "equally legitimate in so far as they do not encroach on other
principles, such for instance, as that of the freedom of the seas."'
Within the work of the United Nations International Law Commission ("ILC"),
one of the more detailed references to abuse of rights is found in the 1953 Report to
the United Nations General Assembly. The report includes the following comment on
the Draft Articles on the International Regulation of Fisheries:
The Commission, in adopting the articles, was influenced by the view that the
prohibition of abuse of rights is supported by judicial and other authority and is
germane to the situation covered by the articles. A State which arbitrarily and
without good reason, in rigid reliance upon the principle of the freedom of the
seas, declines to play its part in measures reasonably necessary for the preser-
vation of valuable, or often essential, resources from waste and exploitation,
abuses a right conferred upon it by international law. The prohibition of abuse
of rights, in so far as it constitutes a general principle of law recognized by
civilized States, provides to a considerable extent a satisfactory legal basis for
the general rule as formulated in article 3.49
In 1960, Francisco Garcfa-Amador wrote in his fifth report as Special Rapporteur
on State Responsibility:
Relatively few authors have troubled to study the applicability of the doc-
trine of "abuse of rights" in international relations. The majority of those who
have done so, however, have not only reached the conclusion that the doctrine
can and should be applied in order to solve particular problems, but also con-
tend that its applicability has already been adequately demonstrated in practice.
46Supra note 4.
41 Procs-verbaux des siances du comit6 (The Hague: Van Langenhuysen Brothers, 1920) at 314-
15, see also 335.
48Ibid. at 315.
"Report of the International Law Commission Covering the Work of Its Fifth Session" (UN Doc.
A/2456) in Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1953, vol. 2 (New York: United Nations,
1959) 200 at 218-19. Article 3 provides for the acceptance by states of a system of regulations for
protecting the fishing resources of specific areas against waste or extermination.
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A survey of international practice, particularly in the jurisprudence of the
courts and claims commissions, clearly shows that at least the basic principle of
the prohibition of abuse of rights is applicable in international relations.'
Garcfa-Amador went on to explain that the principle's purpose was one of "limiting
the exercise of rights which are not always well-defined and precise rules in general
international law or in the particular instruments which recognize them."5'
In 1970 Roberto Ago, Garcia-Amador's successor as Special Rapporteur, posited
that states were required "not to exercise a right beyond the limits of what was rea-
sonable."'52 Endre Ustor expressed a view held by many members of the ILC "that the
question of abuse of rights warranted further study and should not be excluded from
the Commission's codification work."" A.J.P. Tammes' comments during the same
session are especially interesting:
[l]n certain legal situations there was no clearly defined interaction of rights
and obligations and the rights remained undivided in law. Disputes in such
cases could only be decided on the basis of a reasonable balance between the
interests of the parties. State responsibility did not then arise from the violation
of a primary rule of international law, but was determined, in the absence of
such a rule, by the parties themselves or by an impartial authority on the basis
of general rules providing for the settlement of disputes with "due regard for"
or "reasonable regard for" the mutual interests of the parties concerned. Inter-
national instruments dealing with such matters as freedom of the seas, lunar
exploration and activities which could threaten manlind or its environment
were cases in point.'
Tammes thus made two points that will be analyzed at greater length below: first, that
abuse of rights is most needed in those areas of international law where rights remain
undivided, that is, where the limits of those rights have not yet been defined; and sec-
ond, that abuse of rights, while only a general principle of law, can itself give rise to
state responsibility.5
In its work on state responsibility since the early 1970s, the ILC has focused on
secondary obligations, more particularly, those general rules that define the parame-
F.M Garcfa-Amador, "International responsibility", 5th report (UN Doc. A/CN.4/125) in Year-
book of the International Law Commission 1960, vol. 2 (New York: United Nations, 1961) 41 at
paras. 70, 73.
/bhid at para. 75.
52 "1081st Meeting" (2 July 1970) in Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1970, vol. 1
(New York: United Nations, 1971) 222 at para. 31.
""1079th Meeting" (29 June 1970) in Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1970, vol. 1
(New York: United Nations, 1971) 181 at para. 29.
"1975th Meeting" (23 June 1970) in Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1970, vol. 1
(New York: United Nations, 1971) 209 at para. 40.
" See below, note 133 and accompanying text.
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ters and procedures of state responsibility but do not themselves give rise to it. This
explains why the Draft Articles on State Responsibility make no reference to abuse of
rights.' And while one might expect the principle to appear in the Draft Articles on
Injurious Consequences, those articles focus entirely on harm caused across interna-
tional borders, where the more specific neighbour principle of sic utere tuo ut alienum
non Icedas prohibits states from using their territory or allowing it to be used in a
manner that causes injury to other states.' The principle of abuse of rights has not yet
been studied and codified by the mLC; its content and scope of application remain un-
resolved.
III. Abuse of Rights and Its Academic Supporters
Numerous authors have argued that abuse of rights is part of international law.
Nicolas-Socrate Politis, writing in 1925, defined abuse of rights as follows: "[Ill y a
abus si l'int6r& g6nral est 16s6 par le sacrifice d'un int&rt individuel tr~s fort A un
autre int6ret individuel plus faible."5 Noting that the Advisory Committee of Jurists
Draft articles on Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts, adopted by the Intema-
tional Law Commission at its fifty-third session (2001), online: ILC <http'/www.un.orglawfilc/texts/
Statersponsibility/responsibility-articles(e).pdf> (date accessed: 6 May 2002), extracted from Inter-
national Law Commission, Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its Fifty-third
session, UN GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, UN Doc. A156/10 (November 2001), c. IV.E.1, online:
ILC <http:llwww.un.org/lawfilc/reports/2001/200lreport.htm> (date accessed: 6 May 2002) [hereinaf-
ter Draft Articles on State Responsibility].
17 ILC, 'Text of the Draft Articles on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out
of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law (Prevention of Transboundary Damage for Hazardous
Activities) Provisionally Adopted by the Commission on First Reading" in Report of the International
Law Commission on the work of its fiftieth session, UN GAOR, 53d Sess., Supp. No. 10, UN Doc.
A/53/10 (1998), online: United Nations <http:llwww.un.orgllaw/ilc/reportsl1998/98repfra.htm> (date
accessed: 6 May 2002) [hereinafter Draft Articles on Injurious Consequences]. This restrictive focus
was not envisaged when the topic of injurious consequences was included on the ILC's agenda in
1978; see Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1978, vol. 2, part 2 (New York: United Na-
tions, 1979) at 149ff. For a concise review of how the topic was progressively narrowed, see A.E.
Boyle, "State Responsibility and International Liability for Injurious Consequences of Acts not Pro-
hibited by International Law: A Necessary Distinction?" (1990) 39 I.C.L.Q. 1 at 1-8 [hereinafter
Boyle, "State Responsibility"]. On the neighbour principle, see Trail Smelter Case, supra note 42 at
1965; Corfu Channel Case, supra note 41 at 22; Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration on the
Human Environment, 16 June 1972, UN Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1, 11 I.L.M. 1416 [hereinafter
Stockholm Declaration]; Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 14
June 1992, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev. 1, 31 I.L.M. 874 [hereinafter Rio Declaration]; J. Balle-
negger, La Pollution en droit international (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1975) at 66; P. Bimie & A.E.
Boyle, International Law and the Environment (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) at 89ff.
S N.-S. Politis, "Le problme des limitations de la souverainet6 et la th6orie de l'abus des droits
dans les rapports intemationaux" (1925) 1 Rec. des Cours 1 at 81 [footnote omitted].
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had recently identified abuse of rights as a general principle of law,9 he argued that
the principle is well-suited to situations where a right is exercised in an anti-social
manner giving rise to an unjust injury.' Such situations would include certain closures
of international ports" and expulsions of foreign nationals.' In a work devoted to
analyzing the concept of sovereignty, Politis concluded that "les libert6s non r6gle-
ment6es doivent en subir le contr6le grace h la th6orie de l'abus du droit."'
Hans-Jirgen Schlochauer, writing in 1933, engaged in a review of the literature
and practice concerning abuse of rights before concluding that, although the principle
had achieved far less scope of application in international law than in civil law sys-
tems, its future was closely linked to the increasing interdependence of states:
Ultimately the pre-juridical prohibition on arbitrariness, in its most comprehen-
sive meaning, simultaneously found a place and recognition in the international
legal system in the norm of "pacta sunt servanda". Its specific development in
the sense of the emergence of norms characterized as abuse of rights has, how-
ever, in international law only hesitantly been achieved and is in fact only a
concomitant to recent developments. The tighter their multi-meshed interna-
tional relations are tied, the less free and unchecked are States in exercising
their "rights" according to subjective discretion. It is a necessary consequence
of the move from the "ind6pendence des 6tats" to "interdependence", to the
construction of the "communaut6 intemationale", that the originally purely in-
dividualistic character of the international legal order changes to a social char-
acter and that international law, which is above all trade and commercial law,
constructs its norms from the point of view of social goals. This leads to a pro-
gressive widening of state responsibility, whereby it deals above all with the im-
position of restrictions on the degree to which a subject of international law has a
claim vis-A-vis another, without the powers of the first state being extended, in
other words with certain restrictions on the free discretions of states.'
SIbid. at 91. See also Procs-verbaux des siances du comitd, supra note 47 at 314-16, 335.
Politis, ibid at 92.
6" See ibid at 94-101, and specifically Affaire de Portendick (France v. United Kingdom) (1843), 1
Recueil des arbitrages intemationaux 512. Compare Affaire de lafermeture de Buenos-Ayres (Argen-
tina v. United Kingdom) (1870), 2 Recueil des arbitrages intemationaux 637, and the discussion in
Politis, ibid at 98-101.
62 Politis, ibid at 101-09.
'Ibid, at 116.
6
'H.-J. Schlochauer, "Die Theorie des abus de droit im V61kerrecht' (1933) 17 Zeitschrift ftir V1k-
errecht 373 at 378-79 [footnotes omitted, translated by author]:
In der letzten Endes dem prAjuridischen Wfillkiirverbot entstammenden Norm
des "pacta sunt servanda" hat gleichzeitig dieses in seiner umfassendsten Be-
deutung Stellung und Anerkenntnis im V6lkerrechtssysteme gefunden. Seine
spezielle Ausbildung im Sinne der eingangs als Rechtsmilbrauchverbot
charakterisierten Normen aber ist im V6lkerrecht nur z6gernd erfolgt und ei-
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F.A. Mann approached abuse of rights in the context of international currency
law. He argued that "exchange control is abusive if in substance it is an instrument of
economic warfare or a measure preparatory to war or 'an instrument of oppression
and discrimination'."' He also recognized that abuse of rights, like other international
law principles, rests upon the requirement of good faith by which every state is
bound. A state that acts in good faith is unlikely to abuse its rights:
It is the lack of fair and equitable treatment, or of good faith, that is the real and
fundamental and, at the same time, the most comprehensive cause of action of
which all other aspects of State responsibility [...] are mere illustrations. The
difficulties lie in the application rather than the existence of a doctrine the sub-
stance of which it is hard to deny.'
The best known proponent of abuse of rights has been Hersch Lauterpacht, who
argued for a broad interpretation and application of the principle. He asserted that
only the most primitive of societies could allow the unchecked exercise of rights
without regard to their societal consequences, and that the determination of when the
exercise of a right becomes abusive must depend on the specific facts of each case,
rather than the application of an abstract legislative standard. Lauterpacht's abuse of
rights occurs "when a State avails itself of its right in an arbitrary manner in such a
way as to inflict upon another State an injury which cannot be justified by a legitimate
consideration of its own advantage."'67 Lauterpacht thus regarded abuse of rights as the
gentlich erst Begleiterscheinung der neueren Entwicklung. Je enger sich die
vielmaschigen intemationalen Beziehungen kntipfen, desto weniger frei und
ungehemmt werden die Staaten ihre "Rechte" nach subjektivem Ermessen
ausiiben k6nnen. Es ist eine notwendige Folge der Entwicklung von der "ind&
pendence des 6tats" zur " interddpendence", zum Ausbau der "communaut6
intemationale", daB sich der urspriinglich rein individualistische Charakter der
V61kerrechtsordnung zu einem sozialen wandelt und auch das V61kerrecht, das
ja in erster Linie Verkehrs- und Wirtschaftsrecht ist, seine Normen unter dern
Gesichtspunkt sozialer Zielsetzung ausbildet. Es fiihrt dies zu einer fortschre-
itenden Erweiterung der staatlichen Verantwortlichkeit, wobei es sich in erster
Linie urn Aufrichtung von Schranken handelt, auf deren Innehaltung ein V61k-
errechtssubjekt gegentiber einem anderen Anspruch hat, ohne daB dadurch
gleichzeitig die Kompetenz des ersteren erweitert wilrde, mit anderen Worten
also urn gewisse Einschrinkungen des freien Ermessens der Staaten.
EA. Mann, "Money in Public International Law" (1959) 96 Rec. des Cours 1 at 98, citing Re
Helbert Wagg & Co. Ltd., [1956] Ch. 323 at 352.
6EA. Mann, The Legal Aspects ofMoney, 5th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) at 476.
67 L. Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, 8th ed., ed. by H. Lauterpacht (London: Long-
mans, Green & Co., 1955) at 345.
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source of the duty not to interfere with the flow of a river to the detriment of other ri-
parian states, and of the neighbour principle. '
Lauterpacht acknowledged that his was a relatively ambiguous definition that
would, if put to the test before international courts and tribunals, result in a great deal
of discretionary power being granted to judges and arbiters. He therefore promoted
caution in applying the principle:
There is no legal right, however well established, which could not, in some cir-
cumstances, be refused recognition on the ground that it has been abused. The
doctrine of abuse of rights is therefore an instrument which, apart from other
reasons calling for caution in the administration of international justice, must
be wielded with studied restraint.
At the same time, however, he argued that the ability of judges to develop the law is
"particularly important in the international society in which the legislative process by
regular organs is practically non-existent."'7
Paul Guggenheim, commenting on abuse of rights, wrote:
En principe, le droit international, comme tout droit primitif, est un droit sim-
ple, rigide. Dans son application, on se contente g6n6ralement d'examiner si le
sujet de droit a agi dans les limites objectives de la r~gle de droit. Lorsque
celui-ci est un entit6 collective, un Etat, une organisation internationale, un bel-
ligdrant, on ne tient pas compte de sa volont6 subjective, bien qu'une thorie
oppos6e, confirm6e par quelques d6cisions arbitrales isolhes, pr6tende le con-
trake. Toutefois, dams 1'application de certaines r gles d'un caractare trbs g6n6-
ral et abstrait, on 6tudie de plus pr .s la mani~re dont ces normes ont 6t6 excu-
taes et on admet une application plus souple, plus nuanc~e. Une r~gle comme
celle qui conftre la souverainet6 a 1'Etat ind6pendant donne lieu it un abus
lorsqu'ele est appliqu6e das le but de nuire A autrui ou dans un autre but que
celui pour lequel le droit international a 6tabli cette r~gle. L'exercice du pouvoir
discr6tionnaire qu'implique l'application du droit A la souverainet6 n'a alors
que l'apparence de la 16galit6, de la conformit6 an droit.7'
Guggenheim gave two examples of abuse of rights: first, where a state exercises in
bad faith its right to designate the members of a diplomatic mission, for example, by
designating an individual wanted on criminal charges in the host state; and second,
/bid at 346-47. On the neighbour principle, see infra note 86. On the relationship between the
neighbour principle and abuse of rights, see the discussion below, Part V.9 H. Lauterpacht, The Development of International Law by the International Court (London: Stev-
ens & Sons, 1958) at 164 [hereinafter Lauterpacht, Development]; see also H. Lauterpacht, "Droit de
la paix" (1937) 62 Rec. des Cours 95 at 342.
70Lauterpacht, Development, ibid at 162.
7R P Guggenheim, 'la validit6 et la nullit6 des actes juridiques intemationaux" (1949) 74 Rec. des
Cours 195 at 250 [footnotes omitted].
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where a state engages in the economic exploitation of an international river in a man-
ner harmful to a down-river state. The two acts would, however, be dealt with in dif-
ferent ways. The receiving state would have no obligation to recognize the designa-
tion of the member of the diplomatic mission, for the act would simply be void. In
contrast, some of the economic exploitation of the river would already have occurred,
with damage being caused, giving it the character of an illegal act and thus engaging
the normal rules of state responsibility.72
Gerald Fitzmaurice referred to abuse of rights when commenting on a passage in
the United States Nationals in Morocco Case, where the ICJ held: "The power of
making the valuation rests with the Customs authorities, but it is a power which must
be exercised reasonably and in good faith."'73 He wrote:
There is little legal content in the obligation to exercise a right in good faith
unless failure to do so would, in general, constitute an abuse of rights. Here
therefore the Court may be said to have taken a step towards the recognition of
the doctrine propounded in earlier cases by Judge Alvarez."
The most rigorous study of abuse of rights is that produced by Alexandre Kiss in
1952."' Drawing upon an extensive compilation of judicial and arbitral decisions,'6 as
well as state practice," Kiss concluded that the principle was an important part of in-
ternational law and could be an important factor in the ongoing evolution of the inter-
national legal system. Thirty-seven years later, Kiss' view had not changed:
12 Guggenheim, ibid. at 250-54. Today, the latter situation would be governed by the more spe-
cific-and more recently developed-principle of equitable utilization. See generally Convention on
the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 21 May 1997, UN Doc.
A/51/869, online: ILC <http:llwww.un.orgllawfilc/texts/nnavfra.htm> (date accessed: 6 May 2002); X.
Fuentes, "The Criteria for the Equitable Utilization of International Rivers" (1996) 67 Brit. YB. Int'l L.
337.
71 Case Concerning Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco (France v.
United States), [1952] I.C.J. Rep. 176 at 212 [hereinafter United States Nationals in Morocco Case].
7' G. Fitzmaurice, "The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 1951-54: General
Principles and Sources of Law" (1953) 30 Brit. YB. Int'l L. I at 53. See also G. Fitzmaurice, "The
Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice: General Principles and Substantive Law"
(1950) 27 Brit. YB. Int'l L. 1 at 12ff. For the relevant separate and dissenting opinions by Alvarez J.,
see Admission Case, supra note 41; Anglo-Iranian Oil Case, supra note 41; Fisheries Case, supra
note 26.
" A.-C. Kiss, L'abus de droit en droit international (Paris: Librairie gfnfrale de droit et de jurispru-
dence, 1952).
76 See especially Kiss' discussion of The Great Lakes Diversion Case (Canada v. United States),
ibid. at 32-33, and State of New Jersey v. New York City, ibid. at 35.
"' See especially Kiss' discussion of the Boundary Waters Protection Treaty (Canada & United
States) (1909), ibid. at 32-36.
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Labus peut 6tre 1'exercice arbitraire du droit, c'est-A-dire 1'absence de motiva-
tion acceptable, alors que cet exercice porte pr6judice bL un autre Etat. I1 peut
aussi r~sulter d'actes dont les b~n~fices pour l'Etat territorial sont n~gligeables
lorsqu'ils sont compares aux consequences produites sur le territoire de l'autre
Eta 7s
Kiss saw great possibilities for the principle with respect to transboundary pollution,
both in and of itself and as a general principle of law which "peut donner naissance
une nouvelle r~gle sprcifique du droit international interdisant directement de telles
pollutions, sans recourir encore au support de la thdorie de 1'abus de droit."7
In 1972, Michael Akehurst argued "that legislative jurisdiction ... can give rise to
genuine examples of abuse of rights-the State has a right to legislate and acts ille-
gally only because it abuses that right.""3 This would occur "if the legislation is de-
signed to produce mischief in another country without advancing any legitimate inter-
est of the legislating State," or "if legislation is aimed at advancing the interests of the
legislating State illegitimately at the expense of other States."'" Akehurst provided the
following example of the latter scenario:
[D]uring the 1920s proposals were made in the United States Congress to alter
United States law in order to give foreign seamen (serving on foreign ships) a
contractual right to demand half their wages when the ship arrived in a United
States port, even though the law of the flag State postponed the time for pay-
ment; in calculating the wages due to the seamen, advances paid in foreign
countries were to be disregarded (i.e. the employer would have to pay again).
Wages on United States ships were higher than wages on foreign ships, and the
purpose of the proposed legislation (which was never passed) was to encourage
foreign seamen to desert from foreign ships and to take up work on United
States ships, thereby reducing labour costs and rectifying a shortage of labour
on United States ships and increasing labour costs and causing general incon-
venience on foreign ships. It is not surprising that foreign States protested that
the proposed legislation was contrary to international law.2
More recent references in the literature include a call "to apply the international
law principles of good faith and abuse of rights in determining the legality of dis-
" A. Kiss, Droit international de l'environnement (Paris: Pedone, 1989) at 72 [hereinafter Kiss,
Droit international de l'environnement]. See also Kiss, 'Abuse of Rights," supra note 1 at 4-8.
Kiss, Droit international de I'environnement, ibid. at 72.
M. Akehurst, "Jurisdiction in International Law" (1974) 46 Brit. YB. Int'l L. 145 at 189, n. 3.
' Ibid. at 189.
1
2 Ibid. at 189-90, citing 'qhe British Embassy to the Department of State: Memorandum" in Papers
Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1931, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: United States
Government Printing Office, 1946) at 811-14. See also H. Briggs, The Law of Nations, 2d ed. (New
York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1952) at 353.
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crimination in the matter of expropriation of alien property"" and a suggestion that the
principle be used to encourage the resolution of trade disputes concerning the protec-
tion of marine living resources under the dispute settlement system established by the
1982 UNCLOS rather than that of the WTO.' Abuse of rights has also been men-
tioned in the context of the law governing the transboundary movement of hazardous
waste from developed to developing countries."
IV. The Contemporary Relevance of Abuse of Rights
Although abuse of rights finds a significant degree of support in state practice, the
judgments of international courts and tribunals, and academic writing, some authors
contest whether it still has a useful role to play.
Some argue that abuse of rights and the neighbour principle are one and the same
thing, with the neighbour principle being a specific development of abuse of rights for
situations involving the territories of two or more states.' This argument has signifi-
cant implications because until recently at least, most situations where one state's
rights were infringed by the exercise of another state's rights involved the territories
of two or more states. Even when states ventured beyond their borders, they did so
carrying attributes of territorial sovereignty, for instance, through the flagging of ves-
sels and aircraft.' Now that more specific principles have evolved for these trans-
boundary situations, abuse of rights, it is argued, can be placed on the back shelf of
international law, not because the principle has become invalid, but because it is re-
dundant. Yet while this argument is compelling to a certain extent, there remain a few
3 A.EM. Maniruzzaman, "Expropriation of Alien Property and the Principle of Non-Discrimination
in International Law of Foreign Investment: An Overview" (1998) 8 J. Transnat'l L. Pol'y 57 at 68
[footnotes omitted].
R.J. McLaughlin, "Settling Trade-Related Disputes over the Protection of Marine Living Re-
sources: UNCLOS or the WTO?" (1997) 10 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 29 at 66-69.
85 R. Park, "An Examination of International Environmental Racism Through the Lens of Trans-
boundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes" (1998) 5 Indiana J. Global Leg. Stud. 659 at 680, citing
A. Kiss & D. Shelton, International Environmental Law (New York: Transnational, 1991).
'6Gunther Handl explains that the neighbour principle is "but the factual background against which
the exercise of territorial rights must be seen. It does not constitute an independently existing body of
specific legal rules imposing restraints on the exercise of territorial rights but merely represents an ex-
pression of the principle of abuse of rights.' G. Handl, "Territorial Sovereignty and the Problem of
Transnational Pollution" (1975) 69 A.J.I.L. 50 at 56. See also Bimie & Boyle, supra note 57 at 126;
R. Jennings & A. Watts, eds., Oppenheim's International Law, 9th ed., vol. 1 (London: Longman,
1992) at 408. For discussion of the Draft Articles on Injurious Consequences, see below, Part VI.
87 See e.g. UNCLOS, supra note 35 at 1287, arts. 90-94; Convention on Offences and Certain Other
Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, 14 September 1963, I.C.A.O. Doc. 8364, 2 I.L.M. 1042, arts. 3,
16; The Case of the S.S. "Lotus" (France v. Turkey) (1927), P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 9 [hereinafter Lotus
Case]. See also discussion of the Draft Articles on Injurious Consequences, below, Part VI.
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areas and issues where the territorial model is inapplicable and specific principles
have yet to evolve. And, as discussed below in Part VI, the number and importance of
these areas and issues may in fact be growing.
It is also possible to argue that abuse of rights is redundant because it is itself only
a more specific expression of a broader principle, namely that of good faith.' For ex-
ample, Patricia Birnie and Alan Boyle argue that abuse of rights is merely a method of
interpreting rules concerning matters such as the duty to negotiate and consult in good
faith, or another way of formulating a doctrine of reasonableness or a balancing of
interests, and neither approach, they conclude, "adds anything useful."' Bin Cheng
similarly writes: "The theory of abuse of rights ... is merely an application of this
principle [of good faith] to the exercise of rights." But Cheng goes on to elaborate in
considerable detail the history and content of abuse of rights at the international level,
concluding:
Good faith in the exercise of rights ... means that a State's rights must be exer-
cised in a manner compatible with its various obligations arising either from
treaties or from the general law. It follows from this interdependence of rights
and obligations that rights must be reasonably exercised. The reasonable and
bona fide exercise of a right implies an exercise which is genuinely in pursuit
of those interests which the right is destined to protect and which is not calcu-
lated to cause any unfair prejudice to the legitimate interests of another State,
whether these interests be secured by treaty or by general international law. The
exact line dividing the right from the obligation, or, in other words, the line de-
limiting the rights of both parties is traced at a point where there is a reasonable
balance between the conflicting interests involved. This becomes the limit be-
txveen the right and the obligation, and constitutes, in effect, the limit between
the respective rights of the parties. The protection of the law extends as far as
this limit, which is the more often undefined save by the principle of good faith.
Any violation of this limit constitutes an abuse of right and a breach of the ob-
ligation--an unlawful act."
From this perspective, the principle of abuse of rights is not redundant. Instead it is, in
one small but important respect, supplemental to the principle of good faith: it pro-
vides the threshold at which a lack of good faith gives rise to a violation of interna-
tional law, with all the attendant consequences.
' On good faith, see generally R. Kolb, La bonnefoi en droit international public (Pads: Presses
Universitaires de France, 2000); A. D'Amato, "Good Faith" in R. Bernhardt, ed., Encyclopedia of
Public International Law, vol. 2 (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1995) at 599; Cheng, supra note 4 at
105-60.
" Birnie & Boyle, supra note 57 at 126. See similarly quotation from Mann, supra note 66;
D'Amato, ibid. at 600: "Good faith may be said to cover the somewhat narrower doctrine of 'abuse of
rights' [...;] there is no need for an independent, even if subsidiary, concept of abuse of rights."
9" Cheng, supra note 4 at 121.
9'Ibid at 131-32 [emphasis added].
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Abuse of rights may also provide an advantage over the principle of good faith in
that, at least in international law, one need not imply malice in order to establish that
an abuse has occurred.' International courts and tribunals have to presume that states
act in good faith. To do otherwise would call the honour of states into question, risk
introducing political and diplomatic factors into the judicial process, impede interna-
tional relations, and increase the danger of escalation.93 Moreover, as Lauterpacht ex-
plained:
In many cases the use of a right degenerates into a socially reprehensible abuse
of right, not because of the sinister intention of the person exercising the right,
but owing to the fact that, as the result of social changes unaccompanied by
corresponding developments in the law, an assertion of a right grounded in the
existing law becomes mischievous and intolerable."'
Other authors deny that the principle has any validity in international law because
of its imprecise character. Georg Schwarzenberger and E.D. Brown wrote that "it is
difficult to establish what is supposed to amount to an abuse, as distinct from a harsh
but justified use, of a right under international law."9 Jean-David Roulet considered
that such a flexible and imprecise principle could not hope to remedy the primitive
and imprecise character of international law.' Gutteridge went so far as to suggest that
the principle "may get out of hand and result in serious inroads on individual rights,
' See Part II above for more on this issue. Compare Akehurst, supra note 80. G.D.S. Taylor com-
ments: "It is not every 'right' which is reviewable for abuse but only those which are susceptible of
limitation by reference to the reason for exercising them" G.D.S. Taylor, 'The Content of the Rule
Against Abuse of Rights in International Law" (1972-73) 46 Brit. YB. Int'l L. 323 at 352 [footnotes
omitted].
93 See Lake Lanoux Arbitration (France v. Spain) (1957), 24 I.L.R. 101 at 126 (Arbitral Tribunal,
Arbitrators: Petrn, Boila, De Luna, Reuter, De Visscher); Taylor, ibid. at 334 writes: "Without such a
presumption, international intercourse could not continue."
' Lauterpacht, Function of Law, supra note 2 at 286-87. There are at least two approaches that do
not involve implying malice that could be taken to establish that an abuse of rights has occurred. Gut-
teridge, supra note 6 at 32, suggested that an intent to harm be ascertained objectively, so that the test
became "whether the defendant in the action has exercised a right in a prudent and reasonable man-
ner." Alternatively, or additionally, one could look to effect rather than intent. The neighbour principle
involves this sort of consideration. In the Corfu Channel Case, supra note 41, for example, the ques-
tion was not whether Albania intended to harm the United Kingdom, but whether it did cause harm to
that country.
" G. Schwarzenberger & E.D. Brown, A Manual of International Law, 6th ed. (Milton, U.K.: Pro-
fessional Books, 1976) at 84. They acknowledge, however, that the principle is useful in areas of in-
ternational law that are regulated by treaties, particularly within the context of international organiza-
tions (ibid. at 85).
9' J.-D. Roulet, Le caract~re artificiel de la thiorie de l'abus de droit en droit international public
(Neuch~tel: Editions de la Baconni~re, 1958) at 150.
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thus becoming an instrument of dangerous potency in the hands of the demagogue
and the revolutionary."
To some degree, one's response to this argument depends on the view one takes
of the judicial function in international law. Lauterpacht, while advocating caution,'
made his own view clear: "The power to apply some such principle as that embodied
in the prohibition of abuse of rights must exist in the background in any system of
administration of justice in which courts are not purely mechanical agencies."" Or, as
George Fletcher explained with respect to reasonableness in the common law:
[N]o set of rules can determine what is reasonable in all situations. Nor does
reasonableness lend itself to definitive specification on the basis of custom or of
market practices. We do not always know what the reasonable requires, but
working with this open-ended concept at the core of our legal system saves us
from the constricting effects of positivism. Whatever philosophers may argue,
we know that the rule of law means more than the law of rules."°
Judicial discretion and innovation play an important role in the still relatively under-
developed system that is international law. Without judicial innovation, international
organizations might not have functional international legal personality,'1 obligations
erga omnes might not exist,'" and treaty texts might never be open to change as the
result of subsequent practice amongst their parties."3 Although one might not approve
of these developments, that they have occurred demonstrates that judicial innovation
constitutes one way in which international law is made and changed. Judges some-
97 Supra note 6 at 43-44. Gutteridge claimed that this situation exists in Swiss law, writing that the
effect of the adoption of the principle in the Swiss Civil Code "is to make the judge the master of the
situation, and the selection of a criterion of abuse rests entirely in his hands ... The difference between
unconditional and other rights disappears altogether, and there is no right which is not susceptible of
abuse in the eye of the Swiss law" (ibid. at 40). In response to this concern Taylor argues that an abuse
of rights should be considered as an abuse of discretion and subjected to the Wednesbury principles of
English administrative law, with the effect that "no person may, under international law, exercise a
power for a reason, actual or inferred, which is contrary to the purpose or purposes for which interna-
tional law contemplates the power will be used." Supra note 92 at 352.
93See Lauterpacht, Development, supra note 69 at 164.
Ibid at 165.
" Fletcher, supra note 10 at 980 [footnotes omitted].
'0' See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion,
[1949] I.CJ. Rep. 174.
'o See Barcelona Traction Case, supra note 30 at paras. 33-35.
'
03 See Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vhear (Cambodia v. Thailand) (Merits), [1962] I.CJ.
Rep. 6 at 33-34; Air Transport Services Agreement Arbitration (United States v. France) (1969), 38
I.L.R. 182 at 245-46; Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), [1971] I.C.J
Rep. 16 at para. 22. See also M. Byers, Custom, Power and the Power of Rules: International Rela-
tions and Customary International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) at 172-80.
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times need to exercise discretion and innovate, in part because of the relative slowness
with which treaties and rules of customary international law usually change, and in
part because of the longstanding principle of non liquet whereby courts and tribunals
cannot refuse to render a decision on the basis that there is no law."4 And judicial in-
novation could become more prevalent in international law, given the rapid and pro-
found changes occurring as a result of what is colloquially referred to as "globalization",
a process that generates gaps between established law and contemporary problems.
Jerome Elkind has advanced a different critique, that abuse of rights is il-suited to
both the common law and international law, where lengthy codes setting out general
principles do not exist. According to Eliind, the question posed in common law cases
is not whether a right has been abused, but whether there was a right at all. Even in
cases involving statutes,
if a right purportedly granted by a statute is used for purposes other than those
for which the right was granted, common-law courts will not say that there has
been an abuse of the right. Rather they will seek, through statutory interpreta-
tion, to establish whether or not the conduct in question actually falls within the
ambit of the right created by the statute. They may decide either that the con-
duct does not fall within the statute, or they might conclude, albeit reluctantly,
that applicable canons of interpretation do not justify its exclusion. In the latter
case, the conduct will be permitted whatever the motive although the statute
might be acknowledged to be defective. The only remedy would be to amend
the statute at that point, for we would have what is called, in common parlance,
a loophole.' 5
The same situation, Elkind argues, prevails with regard to treaties and customary in-
ternational law, making it "seem appropriate to argue that a right does not exist rather
than that it has been abused."'06
Elkind's critique falls short in several respects. First, he ignores (or fails to pre-
dict) developments in some common law systems that mirror abuse of rights in inter-
"4 See article 12, "Draft on Arbitral Procedure" (UN Doc. A/CN.4/113) in Yearbook of the Interna-
tional Law Commission 1958, vol. 2 (New York: United Nations, 1958) at 8: "the tribunal may not
bring in a finding of non liquet on the ground of the silence or obscurity of the law to be applied " See
also Desgranges v. International Labour Organization (1953), 20 I.L.R. 523 at 530 (Administrative
Tribunal of the International Labour Organization); H. Lauterpacht, "Some Observations on the Pro-
hibition of 'Non Liquet' and the Completeness of the Law" in RM. Van Asbeck et al., eds., Simbole
Verzjl (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1958) 196; J. Stone, "Non liquet and the Function of Law in the
International Community" (1959) 35 Brit. YB. Int'l L. 124; P Weil, "'The Court Cannot Conclude De-
finitively ...' Non Liquet Revisited" (1997) 36 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 109.
'o' J.B. Elkind, "Footnote to the Nuclear Test Cases: Abuse of Right-A Blind Alley for Environ-
mentalists" (1976) 9 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 57 at 71.
'0o Ibid. at 73.
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national law.'" As Kiss explains, the distinction between the existence of an individual
right and the exercise of that right "is illustrated by control exercised on the way indi-
viduals or authorities make use of their rights or competences, such as property rights
or decisions of administrative organs."' More importantly, Elkind mistakenly as-
sumes that the only important difference between civil and common law systems is
the presence or absence of codes, and that international law is therefore more like the
common law with regard to the treatment of rights. However, international law is actu-
ally more like the civil law when it comes to rights, in that both systems tend to charac-
terize some rights as general and primordial.
Rights in civil law systems have traditionally been framed in a general and ab-
stract manner, whereas rights in common law systems are more often based on nar-
rowly focused judicial decisions, sometimes hedged with open-ended modifiers such
as "reasonable" or "substantial", or on relatively precise statutory provisions laced
with exceptions and qualifications.'" As Fletcher has explained, the civil law relies
upon a "structured" legal discourse involving two stages: "first, an absolute norm is
asserted; and second, qualifications enter to restrict the scope of the supposedly dis-
positive norm.."... In other words, the civil law initially sets out expansive abstract
principles which are then, and only then, subject to limitations and exceptions. The
common law, in contrast, is based upon a "flat" legal discourse, whereby all of the
criteria relevant to the resolution of a dispute are dealt with at a single stage."'
Fletcher illustrates the distinction between civil and common law rights with ref-
erence to the right to use force to prevent one's other rights from being encroached
upon, and the need to impose limits upon that right:
German law approaches this problem in the style of structured legal discourse.
According to the criminal code of 1975 ... everyone who suffers an unjustified
invasion of her rights has an absolute privilege to use whatever force is neces-
sary to thwart the invasion. If the only way to stop a fleeing thief, even a child
stealing fruit, is to shoot the thief, the courts and the scholars have supported
the property owner's right to use deadly force. Countering this trend, some
post-war commentators and courts have invoked the principle of "abuse of
'
07 See discussion above, Part I.B.
, Kiss, "Abuse of Rights", supra note 1 at 5.
See Catala & Weir, supra note 6, as quoted in text accompanying note 20. It is noteworthy in this
context that the distinctions between civil and common law approaches are gradually becoming less
clear. For instance, modem codes, such as the Civil Code of Qudbec and the New Netherlands Civil
Code, supra note 15, are relatively detailed and contain their own open-ended modifiers. It is also
noteworthy that the situation is somewhat reversed in the area of constitutional (as opposed to private)
rights. Constitutions in civil law countries often set out numerous exceptions and qualifications to in-
dividual rights whereas written constitutions in common law countries do not.
"oSupra note 10 at 951.
", biti. at 951-53.
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rights" to limit this right at a second stage of analysis. At the first level, there
remains an absolute right to use deadly force when necessary; at the second
level, the exercise of that right comes under scrutiny. If the right is exercised at
excessive cost, it is thought to be "abused" and therefore inoperative. Nothing
in the criminal code supports this restriction. Nonetheless, the method of
structured legal thought permits an additional level of argument, a level where
extra-statutory considerations can limit the explicit provisions of the code."'
International law has traditionally characterized the rights of states as general and
primordial, as integral to state sovereignty and subject to restriction only by way of
state consent. As the PCIJ stated in the 1927 Lotus Case:
International law governs relations between independent States. The rules of law
binding upon States therefore emanate from their own free will as expressed in
conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law and
established in order to regulate the relations between these co-existing independ-
ent communities or with a view to the achievement of common aims. Restric-
tions upon the independence of States cannot therefore be presumed.
113
States have traditionally begun most treaty-making exercises from a posture of
unlimited sovereignty, to which they then negotiate consensual restrictions and ex-
ceptions. Article 2(7) of the Charter of the United Nations is a particularly clear ex-
pression of this approach, which is usually couched in less explicit terms:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of
any State or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement un-
,,2 Ibid. at 951-52 [footnotes omitted]. Fletcher goes on to analyze the distinction between "flat" and
"structured" discourse in terms of how the criminal law of civil law systems distinguishes between
justification and excuse and how the criminal law of common law systems does not (ibid. at 971-78).
See also G.E Fletcher, "Two Modes of Legal Thought" (1981) 90 Yale L.J. 970; G.P Fletcher, "Com-
parative Law as a Subversive Discipline" (1998) 46 Am. J. Comp. L. 683 at 698. It is noteworthy that
the similarity between private-law rights in civil law systems and state rights in international law has
led to the adoption of a multi-staged analysis in the law of state responsibility, whereby the breach of
an international obligation, attributable to the state, must be established prior to the consideration of
"circumstances precluding wrongfulness". See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 56,
part 1 of which is divided into five chapters: "General principles", "Attribution of conduct to a State",
"Breach of an international obligation", "Responsibility of a State in connection of the act of another
State", and "Circumstances precluding wrongfulness".
13 Supra note 87 at 18. See also Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States) (Merits), [1986] I.C.J. Rep. 14 at 135 where the ICJ
noted: "[I]n international law there are no rules, other than such rules as may be accepted by the State
concerned, by treaty or otherwise." See also the quotation from A.J.R Tammes, above in text accom-
panying note 51.
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der the present Charter, but this principle shall not prejudice the application of
enforcement measures under Chapter VII. 4
The same approach also colours traditional conceptions of customary international
law and general principles of law, though these forms of law-making tend to occur
much more gradually, with a greater emphasis on "system-consent' rather than spe-
cific consent to individual rules."'
Yet the traditional centrality of sovereign consent is but one explanation for why
international law has tended to characterize the rights of states as general and primor-
dial; another concerns the difficulty of applying the concept of reasonableness at the
international level. Constructing a hypothetical "man on the Clapham omnibus" re-
quires a greater degree of cultural and situational commonality than has traditionally
been present among many of the states that make up international society."' Although
in recent decades a significant degree of commonality has developed in some areas, a
limited degree of commonality remains characteristic in others. And, in addition to
making it difficult to apply a concept of reasonableness, a lack of commonality makes
it unlikely that specific rules will have evolved in the latter areas to limit rights that
have traditionally been cast in general and primordial terms. Thus, abuse of rights, as
a mediator between otherwise undivided rights, still has a role to play there. As Rob-
ert Jennings and Arthur Watts explain:
If a right is formulated in absolute terms ("a State may expel aliens"), arbitrary
and precipitate action may involve an abuse of that right; if the right is formu-
lated in qualified terms ("a State may take reasonable measures to expel ali-
ens"), such action would be wrongful not so much as an abuse of right but as
being outside the scope of the right claimed. ... The inclusion in a rule of a
qualification requiring reasonableness, or something similar, in its application,
serves much of the purpose of the doctrine of "abuse of rights". That doctrine is
a useful safeguard in relatively undeveloped or over-inflexible parts of a legal
system pending the development of precise and detailed rules."7
Moreover, it may be impossible to develop specific rules for every situation in which
excessive or abusive exercises of rights might require limitation. Reasons similar to
"14 26 June 1945, Can. T.S. 1945 No. 7, online: United Nations <http:llwww.un.orglaboutuncharter/
index.html> (date accessed: 6 May 2002).
"' For further discussion of system consent and customary international law, see V. Lowe, 'Do
General Rules of International Law Exist?" (1983) 9 Rev. Int'l Stud. 207; J. Raz, Practical Reason
and Norms (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990) at 123-29; P. Allott, Eunomia: New Order
for a New World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990) at 145-77; S. Sur, La coutume interna-
tionale (Paris: Libraries Techniques, 1990) at 5, 10.
"
6 For the origins of the Clapham omnibus phrase, see McQuire v. Western Morning News, [1903] 2
K.B. 100 at 109 (C.A.), Collins M.R.; Hall v. Brooklands Auto Racing Club, [1933] 1 K.B. 205 at 224
(C.A.), Greer LJ.; E. Kahn, 'A Trimestrial Potpourri" (1985) 102 S. African L.J. 184 at 186-87.
"' Jennings & Watts, supra note 86 at 407, n. 1.
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these explain why national legal systems have developed concepts such as judicial re-
view, reasonableness, nuisance, legitimate expectation, and abuse of rights. Although
not a substitute for constitutionally-entrenched rights and other higher-order rules,
such concepts fulfill a unique and sometimes necessary role.
International lawyers have looked to the concepts ofjus cogens, erga omnes, and
the related concept of international crimes to impose some limits on otherwise unre-
stricted state rights. However, the existence, content, and applicability of jus cogens
not only remain contentious, but the invocation of such rules results in an all-or-
nothing approach to normative conflict, there being no possibility for balancing rights
and obligations if a peremptory rule will always trump a non-peremptory rule."' Rules
of an erga omnes character have their own limitations, the most important being that
their erga omnes character does not override other rules, but only gives all states the
right to make claims in the event of a violation.' 9 The concept of international crimes,
for its part, has recently been dropped from the ILC's Draft Articles on State Respon-
sibility, in part out of a concern to avoid complicating the rules governing counter-
measures.'"
In any event, these various concepts are inadequate to deal with certain develop-
ments that are amenable to the principle of abuse of rights. These developments in-
clude the greatly increased number of treaty obligations and dispute settlement
mechanisms in international law, which gives rise to a much increased probability of
normative and jurisdictional conflicts. They also include the decline of territory as a
defining feature of international law, particularly with regard to some forms of pollu-
tion, common spaces, and the digital world. Although abuse of rights is no longer of
"' For further discussion ofjus cogens, see generally arts. 53 and 64, Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter Vienna Convention cited to
I.L.M.]; L. Hannikainen, Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens) in International Law: Historical, Develop-
ment, Criteria, Present Status (Helsinki: Finnish Lawyers' Publishing, 1988); S. Kadelbach, Zwin-
gendes Vilkerrecht (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1992); M. Byers, "Conceptualising the Relation-
ship between Jus Cogens and Erga Omnes Rules" (1997) 66 Nordic J. Int'l L. 211.
..9 See generally Barcelona Traction Case, supra note 30 at paras. 33-35; Schachter, International
Law, supra note 40 at 208-13; J. Frowein, "Reactions by Not Directly Affected States to Breaches of
Public International Law" (1994) 248 Rec. des Cours 345 at 405-22.
" See J. Crawford, Special Rapporteur, First Report on State Responsibility (Addendum), UN ILC,
50th Sess., UN Doc. A/CN.4/490/Add.1 (1 May 1998) 2, online: ILC <http://www.un.org/law/ilc/
sessions/50/english/n9811945.pdf> (date accessed: 6 May 2002). For commentary on this decision,
see G. Abi-Saab, "The Uses of Article 19" (1999) 10 Eur. J. Int'l L. 339; A. Pellet, "Can a State
Commit a Crime? Definitely, Yes!" (1999) 10 Eur J. Int'l L. 425. On international crimes, see gener-
ally article 19 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility as adopted by the Commission on first
reading: ILC, Report on the Forty-Eighth Session, UN GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 10, UN Doc.
A/51/10 (1996), online: ILC <http://www.un.org/law/ilc/reports/1996/96repfra.htm> (date accessed: 6
May 2002); J. Weiler et al., eds., International Crimes of State: A Critical Analysis of the ILC's Draft
Article 19 on State Responsibility (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1989).
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general application in an increasingly sophisticated and detailed international legal
system, it retains considerable relevance in these particular areas.
V. Abuse of Rights and Normative Conflicts
The Shrimp-Turtle Case illustrates that abuse of rights can sometimes play an im-
portant role in the resolution of normative conflicts.'2 ' There, the WTO Appellate
Body held that a United States import ban on shrimp harvested without approved
"turtle excluder devices" fell within the scope of the article XX(g) exception to the
GATT as a measure "relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources."'"
It then turned to the chapeau of article XX, which reads:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction
on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent
the adoption or enforcement by any Member of measures...2
The Appellate Body held that these clauses had to be interpreted and applied against
the backdrop of abuse of rights:
To permit one Member to abuse or misuse its right to invoke an exception
would be effectively to allow that Member to degrade its own treaty obligations
as well as to devalue the treaty rights of other Members. If the abuse or misuse
is sufficiently grave or extensive, the Member, in effect, reduces its treaty obli-
gation to a merely facultative one and dissolves its juridical character, and, in so
doing, negates altogether the treaty rights of other Members.2
The Appellate Body then engaged in what it referred to as the "delicate" task "of lo-
cating and marking out a line of equilibrium between the right of a Member to invoke
"2 Supra note 43. In support of its invocation of abuse of rights, the Appellate Body cited Cheng,
supra note 4 at 125; Jennings & Watts, supra note 86 at 407-10; Case Concerning Border and Trans-
border ArmedActions (Nicaragua v. Honduras), [1988] I.CJ. Rep. 69 at 105; United States Nationals
in Morocco Case, supra note 73; Fisheries Case, supra note 26 at 142. It is possible that the Appellate
Body's first reference to abuse of rights was in fact in United States-Standardsfor Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline (Complaint by the United States) (1996), WTO Doc. WT/DS2/AB/R (Appel-
late Body Report), online: WTO <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispue/dispu-statuse.htm
#1996> (date accessed: 6 May 2002). But there the reference was to "abuse or illegitimate use of the
exceptions to substantive rules available in Article XX" (ibid. at para. 27). The term "abuse of rights"
or "abus de droif' was not specifically invoked. See J. Waincymer, "Reformulated Gasoline Under
Reformulated WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures: Pulling Pandora Out of a Chapeau?" (1996) 18
Mich. J. Int'l L. 141.
'2Shrimp-Turtle Case, supra note 43 at paras. 125-45.
' The chapeau serves as an introductory clause to article XX, see ibid. at para. 113.
1I4 Ibid. at para. 156.
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an exception ... and the rights of the other Members under varying substantive provi-
sions."',"2
At least two subsequent WTO panels have also invoked the principle of abuse of
rights more particularly in situations involving a prohibition on asbestos imports and a
failure to implement the recommendations of a WTO panel and the Appellate Body
within a reasonable period of time.'" Abuse of rights is thus helping to resolve not
only the tensions that currently exist between international trade principles and envi-
ronmental, health, and similar concerns,'" but also tensions between different ambigu-
ously defined rights within the WTO dispute settlement process.
Normative conflicts of this kind would appear to be increasing in number, for
"[a]s a society becomes more integrated more obligations are laid upon its members
and the rights of each subject of law become also more restricted."'" Some authors
have already recognized that rules of a conflicts of law character are required in inter-
national law, just as they have long been needed in national legal systems.'" From the
'
2 Ibid. at para. 159. The Appellate Body also noted that the location of this line "moves as the kind
and the shape of the measures at stake vary and as the facts making up specific cases differ." In this
instance, it found that the State Department, without taking into consideration conditions within other
WTO members, required them to adopt essentially the same regulatory program as the U.S., and that
it had failed to engage in serious negotiations for the protection of sea turtles. Instead, it opted for ne-
gotiations with regard to some members and a unilateral import ban, imposed through non-
transparent, exparte processes, with regard to others. This constituted unjustifiable as well as arbitrary
discrimination, and therefore violated article XX.
"' See European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products
(Complaint by Canada) (2000), WTO Doc. WT/DS135/R at para. 8.259 (Panel Report), online: WTO
<http://www.wto.orgenglishltratop-e/dispuedispustatuse.htm#2000> (date accessed: 6 May
2002) [hereinafter Asbestos Case]; United States-Import Measures on Certain Products from the
European Communities (Complaint by the European Communities) (2000), WTO Doc. WT/DS165/R
at para. 6.112 (Panel Report), online: WTO <http://www.wto.orglenglish/tratope/dispu-e/dispu.
status_e.htm#2000> (date accessed: 6 May 2002).
127 For further discussion on this tension, see generally "Symposium: The United States-Import
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products Case" (1998) 9 YB. Int'l Env. L. 3; D. Aim, "En-
vironmental Disputes in the GATI'/WTO: Before and After US-Shrimp Case" (1999) 20 Mich. J. Int'l
L. 819; H. Nordstr6m & S. Vaughan, Trade and Environment (Geneva: World Trade Organization,
1999).
'2 Cheng, supra note4 at 131.
.29 See e.g. W. Czaplinski & G. Danilenko, "Conflicts of Norms in International Law" (1990) 21
Netherl. YB. Int'l L. 3; A.E. Boyle, "Dispute Settlement and the Law of the Sea Convention: Prob-
lems of Fragmentation and Jurisdiction" (1997) 46 I.C.L.Q. 37; J.B. Mus, "Conflicts Between Trea-
ties in International Law" (1998) 45 Netherl. Int'l L. Rev. 208; J. Chamey, "Is International Law
Threatened by Multiple International Tribunals?" (1998) 271 Rec. des Cours 101; "Symposium Issue:
The Proliferation of International Tribunals: Piecing Together the Puzzle" (1999) 31 N.YU. J. Int'l L.
& Pol. 679.
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common law tradition, the principles of resjudicata and lis pendens are needed to re-
solve conflicts between the differing jurisdictions and decisions of an increasing
number of international courts and tribunals. The principles of lexposteri and lex spe-
cialis are already being used to resolve conflicts between differing treaty obliga-
tions,'" while the concept of ordre public, in the form ofjus cogens, is sometimes in-
yoked by courts and tribunals struggling to deal with conflicting rights, obligations,
and interests.'3' But as has already been explained, jus cogens rules provide only a
partial answer to conflicts of law situations in international law, much as concepts of
ordre public provide only a partial answer to conflicts in and between national legal
systems. "2 It is in this context of an increasingly dense and complex international legal
system, brimming with potential conflicts of law, that the principle of abuse of rights
continues to find application.
When abuse of rights was discussed by the ILC during the 1960s and 1970s,
A.J.P. Tammes argued that the principle was a special source of state responsibility in
situations where "there was no clearly defined interaction of rights and obligations
and the rights remained undivided in law..'33 Francisco Garcfa-Amador, acting then as
the commission's first Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility, took a similar ap-
proach,'3 while his successor, Roberto Ago, altered the language somewhat by pro-
posing a "primary rule" to the effect "that States were under an international obliga-
tion not to exercise their rights beyond a certain limit.' 3  Terminological differences
aside, these members of the JLC recognized that abuse of rights may be particularly
'"On lexposteri, see Vienna Convention, supra note 118, art. 30(3) at 691. On lex specialis, see A.
McNair, The Law of Treaties (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961) at 219-20; G. Fitzmaurice, "The Law
and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 1951-4: Treaty Interpretation and Other Points"
(1957) 33 Brit. YB. Int'l L. 203 at 236-38. For a discussion of earlier applications of both principles,
see Mavromnatis Palestine Concessions (Jurisdiction) Case (1924), P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 2 at 32;
European Commission of the Danube (Advisory Opinion) (1927), P.C.I.J. (Ser. B) No. 14 at 23.
' Onjus cogens, see generally supra note 118.
132 See discussion above, Part IV. That said, where such peremptory rules do exist, they will super-
sede the principle of abuse of rights in their application. See e.g. article 26 of the Draft Articles on
State Responsibility, supra note 56: "Nothing in this chapter precludes the wrongfulness of any act of
a State which is not in conformity with an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general in-
ternational law"
' "1075th Meeting" in Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1970, vol. 1 (New York:
United Nations, 1971) 181 at para. 40.
'" Supra note 50 at 57-58. For further discussion see Part II above.
... R. Ago, "The Internationally Wrongful Act of the State, Source of International Responsibility"
3rd report on State responsibility (UN Doe. A/CN.4/246 and Add. 1-3) in Yearbook of the Interna-
tional Law Commission 1971, vol. 2, part 1 (New York: United Nations, 1973) 199 at para. 68
(CN.4/SER.A/1971/Add.1 (Part 1)). Ago proposed this change so that the constituent element of the
wrongful act would "still be represented by the violation of an obligation and not by the exercise of a
right' (ibid at para. 68).
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useful when there is a lack of clarity as to the limits needed to resolve or prevent nor-
mative conflicts. That said, the principle should not be regarded as a substitute for
other criteria such as good faith, reasonableness, or normal administration, if those are
already clearly set out as part of an existing rule.'"
Along similar lines, Vaughan Lowe proposes that concepts such as sustainable
development and abuse of rights are best regarded as "interstitial norms".'" Such
norms do not have any "independent normative charge of their own" but instead "di-
rect the manner in which competing or conflicting norms that do have their own nor-
mativity should interact in practice.' 38 As Lowe explains:
These interstitial or modifying norms are simply concepts. If the tribunal
chooses to adopt the concept, the very idea of sustainable development is
enough to point the tribunal towards a coherent approach to a decision in cases
where development and environment conflict. There is absolutely no need for
the concept to have been embodied in State practice coupled with the associ-
ated opinio juris. Its employment does not depend upon it having normative
force of the kind held by primary norms of international law. Tribunals employ
interstitial norms not because those norms are obligatory as a matter of law, but
because they are necessary in order that legal reasoning should proceed. All
that is needed to enable the norms to perform this role is that they be clearly
and coherently articulated ...
These interstitial norms can exercise a very great influence on the system.
For instance, the importance of sustainable development in reconciling the con-
flicting demands of development and the environment can scarcely be over-
stated.
139
Lowe considers abuse of rights to be an interstitial norm of growing importance:
The effect of interstitial norms is to set the tone of the approach of international
law to contemporary problems, bringing subtlety and depth to the relatively
crude, black-and-white quality of primary norms. I have used one example; but
I expect there to be many others in the coming decades, during a phase in the
development of international law analogous to the development of equity in
English law ... The concept of abus de droit, already established in the ap-
proach of civil lawyers to international law, is likely to achieve much greater
prominence as a check upon exercises of legal power by States."
136 See I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 5th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998)
at 448.
"7 V. Lowe, "The Politics of Law-making: Are the Method and Character of Norm Creation
Changing?" in M. Byers, ed., The Role of Law in International Politics: Essays in International Rela-
tions and International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 207 at 212-21.
Ibid. at 216.
I39 bid. at 217 [emphasis in original].
40 Ibid. at 218.
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Whether as a general principle of law or as an "interstitial norm", the principle of
abuse of rights still has an important role to play. Moreover, that role might extend
beyond situations of normative conflict into situations where the problem is the ab-
sence of a countervailing right rather than the problem of mediating between different
rights.
Vl. Abuse of Rights, Common Spaces, and Matters of Common
Concern
The principle of abuse of rights may be particularly useful in those situations
where rights have traditionally been the least restricted, for example, with regard to
activities by states within their own territory. As Francisco Garcfa-Amador explained:
"[I]t is necessarily true that the doctrine of the abuse of rights finds its widest applica-
tion in the context of 'unregulated matters', that is, matters which 'are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction' of States.""' One example of such a matter involves
nationality, where there is a lack of agreement as to whether the revocation of nation-
ality causing statelessness is prohibited by customary international law."2 In response,
a number of scholars have suggested that unnecessary and extreme but otherwise le-
gal actions taken by a state against its own population, including mass revocations of
nationality so as to cause statelessness, could be regarded as abuses of rights.'43
A second, related example concerns the right of states to expel aliens from their
territory. Although in most instances this right is not limited by customary interna-
tional law, Liechtenstein argued in the Nottebohm Case that Guatemala's refusal to re-
admit Nottebohm, who had attained permanent resident status there, was an abuse of
'4, Supra note 50 at 60.
'
42 See J.M. Chan, "The Right to Nationality as a Human Right: The Current Trend Towards Recog-
nition" (1991) 12 H.R.L.J. 1 at 13-14; R. Plender, "The Legal Basis of International Jurisdiction to
Act with Regard to the Internally Displaced" (1994) 6 Int'l. J. Refugee L. 345 at 356 (arguing that
there is no such right); J.L. Blackman, "State Succession and Statelessness: The Emerging Right to an
Effective Nationality Under International Law" (1998) 19 Mich. J. Int'l L. 1141 at 1191; T.L. Lee,
"Refugees from Bhutan: Nationality, Statelessness and the Right to Return" (1998) 10 Int'l J. Refugee
L. 118 at 139 (arguing that such a right exists); "Draft articles on nationality of natural persons in re-
lation to the succession of States" in JLC, Report of the International Law Commission on the work of
itsfifty-first session, UN GAOR, 54th Sess., Supp. No. 10, UN Doc. A/54/10 (1999), c. IV.E.1 at art.
15, online: ILC <http://www.un.orgllawfilc/reports/1999/english/99repfra.htnm> (date accessed: 6 May
2002).
41 See Lauterpacht, Function of Law, supra note 2 at 300-01; Jennings & Watts, supra note 86 at
408; Plender, ibid at 356. Compare P Weis, Nationality and Statelessness in International Law (Lon-
don: Stevens, 1956) at 116-17, 129.
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its right to regulate the admission of aliens because the refusal of re-admission was
without just cause and equivalent to an illegal expulsion.'"
Another area where abuse of rights finds application is with regard to activities
that occur outside the territory of any state, in "common spaces" such as the high seas,
or in multiple states without any particular territorial nexus, as is the case with the
Internet and some sources of pollution. Territory is becoming a less salient feature of
the international legal landscape as contemporary problems increasingly reach across
and beyond state borders, blurring traditional concepts of sovereignty and responsi-
bility.
The UNCLOS and other instruments demonstrate that many states are now will-
ing to surrender some of their freedom to act in common spaces in favour of an envi-
ronmental common interest, with concepts such as the "common heritage of man-
kind" having become an accepted part of international law."' However, there is still no
specific, widely accepted body of law governing the pollution of common spaces.
Treaty law, either with regard to the high seas, "6 the Antarctic "7 or space, " suffers
from both a lack of precision and a limited number of ratifications. For example, in
article VII(3) of the "Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and
Flora" the contracting parties affirm with regard to marine pollution: "Each Partici-
pating Government shall take all reasonable steps towards the alleviation of pollution
of the waters adjacent to the coast and ice shelves."'' 9 Similarly, the pollution provi-
sions of the UNCLOS focus on the obligations of individual states to "adopt laws and
regulations to prevent, reduce and control pollution."'" ° As Alan Boyle points out with
'44 Nottebohm Case, supra note 27. See also Boffolo Case, supra note 42; Politis, supra note 58 at
101-09. See generally G. Goodwin-Gill, International Law and the Movement of Persons between
States (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978) at 201-3 10.
"' See art. 136 UNCLOS, supra note 35 at 1293; K. Baslar, The Concept of the Common Heritage
of Mankind in International Law (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1998); R.St.J. Macdonald, "The
Common Heritage of Mankind" in U. Beyerlin et al., eds., Recht zwischen Umbruch und Bewahrung:
Festschriftfiir Rudolf Bernhardt (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1995) 153. On international environmental
law generally, see Bimie & Boyle, supra note 57.
46 See UNCLOS, ibid; United Nations Convention on the High Seas, 29 April 1958,450 U.N.T.S. 11.
'W Antarctic Treaty, 1 December 1959, 402 U.N.T.S. 71, 12 U.S.T. 794; Conference on the Conser-
vation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, 20 May 1980, 19 I.L.M. 837.
148 See United Nations: Draft Convention on Liability for Damage Caused by Objects Launched
into Outer Space, Report of the Legal Sub-Committee of its Tenth Session, UN Legal Sub-Committee,
1971, UN Doc. A/A.C.105/94, 10 I.L.M. 965.
,49 Appendix to Antarctica: Measures in Furtherance of Principles and Objectives of the Antarctic
Treaty, Recommendations of Third Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting, 2-13 June 1964, 17 U.S.T.
991 at 999 (TIAS 6058).
'10 UNCLOS, supra note 35, art. 207 (pollution from land-based sources). See also UNCLOS arts.
208 (pollution from sea-bed activities subject to national jurisdiction), 210 (pollution by dumping),
211 (pollution from vessels), 212 (pollution from or through the atmosphere).
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regard to the latter treaty, "To say that states have a duty to regulate pollution is to beg
the question what regulations they must adopt, a question the Convention does not
satisfactorily answer."5' Boyle goes on to write that "there is an insidious uncertainty
about too much of the phraseology and a danger it may be used to undermine the
Convention's effectiveness.' ' 2
The existence of detailed customary international law with regard to pollution in
these areas is doubtful,' 3 in part because state practice indicates that many govern-
ments feel that they can, with impunity, permit pollution to occur.'" Similar problems
exist with regard to high seas fishing and whaling.'
Moreover, almost all the instruments that address pollution in common spaces
deal with the issue of liability in terms of damage to natural or juridical persons,"
with some only providing the possibility of compensation for injuries caused within
state territory.' The 1988 Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Re-
... A. Boyle, "Marine Pollution under the Law of the Sea Convention" (1985) 79 AJ.I.L. 347 at 357.
... Ibid. at 357. See also LA. Bernhardt, 'A Schematic Analysis of Vessel-Source Pollution: Pre-
scriptive and Enforcement Regimes in the Law of the Sea Conference" (1979) 20 Va. J. Int'l L. 265.
' See Boyle, ibi1 at 366.
4 Greenpeace estimates that 568,000 tons of oil are dumped or spilled into the oceans each year by
the shipping industry. Oil platforms account for additional spills but Greenpeace makes no estimates on
that figure. See Greenpeace Research Laboratories, "Report on the World's Oceans" (1998), online:
Greenpeace <http://www.greenpeace.org[-oceans/> (date accessed: 6 May 2002). An industry group,
the International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation Limited, estimates that in the 1990s anywhere
from 9,000 tons (in 1995) to 435,000 tons (in 1991) of oil were spilled by tankers. The group reports
that annual spill rates vary dramatically year by year, but in the aggregate there has been a downward
trend in spills from oil tankers. See '"TOPF Historical Data: Statistics," online: International Tanker
Owners Pollution Federation <httpJ/wvw.itopf.com/stats.html> (date accessed: 6 May 2002).
'.. For further discussion on high seas fishing, see W.T. Burke, The New International Law of Fish-
eries: UNCLOS 1982 and Beyond (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994); R. Rayfuse, "Enforcement of
High Seas Fisheries Agreements: Observation and Inspection under the Convention on the Conserva-
tion of Antarctic Marine Living Resources" (1998) 13 Int'l J. Marine & Coastal L. 579 at 585; N.
Nelson, "International Concern for the Sustainability of the World's Fisheries: United Nations Efforts
to Combat Over-Fishing and International Debate Over State Fishing Subsidies" (1999) Colo. J. Int'l
Envtl. L. & Pol'y 157. On whaling, see H.S. Schiffman, "The Protection of Whales in International
Law: A Perspective for the Next Century" (1996) 22 Brooklyn J. Int'l L. 303; J.D. Lindemann, "The
Dilemma of the International Whaling Commission: The Loophole Provisions of the Commission vs.
the World Conscience" (1998) 7 Detroit J. Int'l L. & Pract. 491.
'6 See Principle 22 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration, supra note 57 and Principle 13 of the 1992
Rio Declaration, supra note 57; UNCLOS, supra note 35. See generally M. Arsanjani & W.M. Reis-
man, 'The Quest for an International Liability Regime for the Protection of the Global Commons" in
K. Wellens, ed., International Law: Theory and Practice. Essays in Honour of Eric Say (The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1998) 469.
7 See e.g. International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 29 November
1969,973 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 2.
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source Activities was a striking exception to the general pattern in that it provided the
possibility of compensation for harm caused to the Antarctic environment independ-
ent of that harm's consequences for individual persons. '58 However, the Convention
never entered into force and it was superseded by the 1991 Madrid Protocol on Envi-
ronmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty.'59 And while the Madrid Protocol put in
place a moratorium on Antarctic mining, it does not, as yet, contain a liability regime."6
As was explained above, the ILC has avoided the issue of common spaces when
preparing its Draft Articles on Injurious Consequences."' The commission attempted
to pre-empt criticism of its decision not to deal with liability for injurious conse-
quences except in transboundary situations by defining "transnational harn" in an
extremely broad manner, as "harm caused in the territory of or in other places under
the jurisdiction or control of a State other than the State of origin, whether or not the
States concerned share a common border."'62 In its commentary to the draft articles,
however, the commission specified that transnational harm includes, inter alia, "inju-
rious impacts on ships or platforms of other States on the high seas."'"4 The focus
throughout is on harm caused to individual states rather than harm caused to common
spaces such as the high seas, Antarctica, or space.
The decision not to include harm caused to common spaces was criticized by sev-
eral states in their responses to a version of the Draft Articles on Injurious Conse-
quences circulated in 1998. For example: "The Netherlands deplores the absence of a
provision on the obligation to prevent damage to common areas, i.e., areas beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction."'6 " Italy not only disagreed with the decision, it also
"' 25 November 1988, 27 I.L.M. 859. Art. 8(2)(a) reads: "An Operator shall be strictly liable for ...
damage to the Antarctic environment or dependent or associated ecosystems arising from its Antarctic
mineral resource activities, including payment in the event that there has been no restoration to the
status quo ante." See generally R. Wolfrum, The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral
Resource Activities (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1991); A. Watts, International Law and the Antarctic
Treaty System (Cambridge: Grotius, 1992) at 165-204; C.C. Joyner, Governing the Frozen Commons
(Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1998) at 149, 169-73.
' 3 October 1992, 30 I.L.M. 1455, online: Antarctica Online <http://www.antdiv.gov.au/
information/treaty/protocol.asp> (date accessed: 6 May 2002) [hereinafter Madrid Protocol]. See
generally L. Pineschi, "The Madrid Protocol on the Protection of the Antarctic Environment and Its
Effectiveness" in F Francioni & T. Scovazzi, eds., International Law for Antarctica (The Hague:
Kluwer Law International, 1996) 261.
o See Madrid Protocol, ibid., art. 16, which simply postpones negotiations on rules and procedures
concerning liability. See generally . Francioni, "Liability for Damage to the Antarctic Environment"
in Francioni & Scovazzi, eds., ibid. 581.
"' Supra note 57. See discussion above, notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
.
62 Ibid., art. 2(c).
163 Ibid.
'6ILC, Report of the Secretary-General, International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising
Out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law (Prevention of Transboundary Damage from Haz-
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pointed out that the ICJ, in its advisory opinion on the Legality of the Use by a State
of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, "had referred to prevention specifically in re-
lation to regions over which no State had sovereignty.'""
In contrast, the Draft Articles on State Responsibility would extend to common
spaces, for instance, through the application of article 48(1): "Any State other than an
injured State is entitled to invoke the responsibility of another State ... if ... (b) The
obligation breached is owed to the international community as a whole."" However,
the Draft Articles on State Responsibility are premised on the existence of an "inter-
nationally wrongful act of a State", in other words, "a breach of an international obli-
gation of the State."' 7 In addition, they are inapplicable where clear legal rules do not
yet limit the exercise of states' rights in common spaces, at least since the ILC created
a distinction between wrongful and lawful activities within the law of state responsi-
bility, broadly speaking.'" And with "international liability for injurious consequences
of acts not prohibited by international law" being the new paradigm for dealing with
environmental harm in transboundary situations, the more traditional approach of de-
veloping new obligations to limit old rights could become all the more difficult with
regard to other kinds of environmental harm.
That said, as the problem of extraterritorial pollution becomes increasingly seri-
ous, and fish stocks and whale populations suffer further declines, treaties and rules of
customary international law will undoubtedly be developed to provide more precise
rules for common spaces. This will take time, with progress requiring the co-operation
of the vast majority of states, many of which face contradictory and often pervasive
pressures, such as feeding, employing, and housing their people. It is also clear that
pollution, over-fishing, and whaling disputes arising in common spaces will increas-
ingly be taken to international courts and tribunals, even before any specific law
evolves. Early examples of this trend include the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case," where
ardous Activities), UN GA ILC, 52d Sess., UN Doc. A/CN.4/509 at 5 (17 April 2000), online: ILC
<http:llwww.un.orgllawfilc/sessions/52/english/acn4509e.pdf> (date accessed: 6 May 2002).
'6 ILC, Report on the fiftieth session, UN GAOR, 53d Sess., UN Doc. A/C.6/53/SR.15 at para. 65.
For a contrary view, see China's comments, UN Doc. A/C.6/53/SR.14 at par. 40.
'66Supra note 56.
'6 Ibidr, art. 2(b).
'' The distinction has been described as "fundamentally misconceived". See L Brownlie, State Re-
sponsibility (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983) at 50. See similarly M.B. Akehurst, "International Li-
ability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts not Prohibited by International Law" (1985)
16 Netherl. YB. Int'l L. 3 at 8. For a lengthy analysis of the distinction, see Boyle, "State Responsi-
bility", supra note 57.
' (Spain v. Canada), [1998] I.CJ. Rep. 4. The dispute concerned the adoption of national legisla-
tion enabling the seizure of foreign fishing vessels on the high seas, and the subsequent arrest of a
Spanish trawler pursuant to that legislation. The court concluded that it did not have jurisdiction be-
cause of a reservation concerning fisheries conservation measures, entered into by Canada in 1994, in
respect of its acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction.
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Spain sought to take Canada to the ICJ over unilateral efforts to protect straddling fish
stocks, and the Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, where Australia and New Zealand
sought to take Japan to arbitration under Annex VII of the UNCLOS.'°
In the absence of more specific rules and principles, international courts and tri-
bunals faced with these issues could, and probably should, look to abuse of rights as a
general principle of law whose violation in itself constitutes a wrong giving rise to
state responsibility. Applying the principle to common spaces, a state's right to pollute
or extract resources would be weighed against international society's interest in a
clean, sustainable environment.'"' Initially, state rights might be accorded considerable
weight. But though it remains uncertain at what point international courts and tribu-
nals would accept and apply the broad powers offered by abuse of rights with regard
to these issues, as the global environment becomes increasingly threatened, the bal-
ance will eventually shift in favour of community interests. When and how it does so
will depend on how important the interest in a clean environment is considered to be,
and the ambient perception of how much degradation can be tolerated.
In this context, it should be noted that rights may be abused either immediately or
prospectively. The interest in clean oceans would be injured in an immediate manner
if, by some catastrophic accident, the biota of an entire ocean were eliminated by the
discharge of some horrendously poisonous substance. Yet the same interest would
also be injured by any small spill of a destructive substance, although that spill might
not itself cause widespread damage. In itself, a small spill will not amount to an abuse
of rights. However, if the exercise of the right to discharge a small quantity denies the
interest in a clean ocean in concert with similar exercises of that right by others, then
"o The dispute concerned the conservation and management of southern bluefin tuna under the Con-
vention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, 10 May 1993, A.T.S. 1994 No. 16, online:
Australian Legal Information Institute <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1994/16.hml>
(date accessed: 6 May 2002). Provisional measures were granted by the International Tribunal for the
Law of the Sea. See New Zealand v. Japan, Australia v. Japan (Provisional Measures) (1999), Cases
Nos. 3 and 4, online: International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea <http://www.iflos.org/startL2
en.html> (date accessed: 6 May 2002). The arbitral tribunal that was subsequently constituted to hear
the case, however, held that article 16 of the 1993 Convention requires the consent of all parties for ad-
judication or arbitration under the UNCLOS, and that Japan had not consented. See Australia and New
Zealand v. Japan (2000), (Arbitral Tribunal, Arbitrators: Schwebel, Feliciano, Keith, Tresselt, Yamada),
online: International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes <http://www.worldbank.orghcsid/
bluefintuna/main.htm> (date accessed: 6 May 2002).
"' The development of substantive rules on the protection of common spaces does not, of course, in
itself provide standing for the enforcement of such rules. Although the issue of standing is not ad-
dressed here, the development of enforcement mechanisms usually follows, rather than predates, the
creation of substantive rules. For a useful overview of the standing issue, see J. Chamey, 'Third State
Remedies for Environmental Damage to the World's Common Spaces" in F Francioni & T. Scovazzi,
eds., International Responsibility for Environmental Harm (London: Graham & Trotman, 1991) 149.
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any of the contributing acts might be regarded as abusive. Lauterpacht hinted at this
balance when he wrote that there is an abuse of rights "each time the general interest
of the community is injuriously affected as the result of the sacrifice of an important
social or individual interest to a less important, though hitherto legally recognized, in-
dividual right."'-
It is also noteworthy that developments in international environmental law are
beginning to extend beyond the usual situations of transboundary pollution and efforts
to protect common spaces into "matters of common concern" that fit neither of these
more traditional paradigms." As with the nationality and expulsion of aliens exam-
ples referred to above, how states behave within their territories can sometimes cause
disproportionate harm to the particular or common interests of other states, even if
those states are not neighbours. When such instances are not already governed by
more specific principles, abuse of rights could, and perhaps already does, apply.
VII. Abuse of Rights and the Promotion of Normative Change
Abuse of rights may also play a role in promoting legal change. As Lowe sug-
gests, abuse of rights may encourage the development of more precise principles lim-
iting the exercise of rights, or at least greater specificity in the drafting of treaties, as
part of a general move towards the greater inclusion of equitable concepts in interna-
tional law. ' For example, the meaning of the chapeau to article XX of the GATr
might well be clarified by way of a further agreement among the member states of the
WTO as a result, in part, of the Appellate Body's decision in the Shrimp-Turtle
Case."' A more likely development, however, is that repeated applications of abuse of
rights to the chapeau will result in greater specificity through the resulting body of
'"Lauterpacht, Function of Law, supra note 2 at 286.
' See F. Kirgis, "Standing to Challenge Human Endeavors that Could Change the Climate" (1990)
84 AJ.IL. 525 at 527; J. Bmnn6e & S. Toope, "Environmental Security and Freshwater Resources: A
Case for International Ecosystem Law" (1994) 5 YB. Int'l Env. L. 41 at 73-74; the Preamble to the
1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Convention on Biological Diver-
sity, 4 June 1993, Can. T.S. 1993 No. 24, 31 I.L.M. 818, online: Convention on Biological Diversity
<http://www.biodiv.org/convention/articles.asp> (date accessed: 6 May 2002), which states that "the
conservation of biological diversity is a common concern of humandnd"; the Preamble to the 1992
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Framework Convention on Climate
Change, 19 June 1993, Can. T.S. 1994 No. 7, 31 I.L.M. 849, online: United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change <http:/unfccc.intlresourcelconv/mdex.html> (date accessed: 6 May
2002), which states that "change in the Earth's climate and [the] adverse effects [of rapid climate
change] are a common concern of humankind "
'74 Lowe, supra note 137 at 208. See discussion above, Part V.
75Supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text. See discussion above, Part V.
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case law, which might eventually make the express articulation of abuse of rights no
longer required. '
As Wolfgang Friedmann explained with regard to the expropriation of foreign-
owned property:
In the present greatly diversified family of nations-which comprises states of
starkly differing stages of economic development, as well as of conflicting po-
litical and social ideologies--the notions, for example, of "equity," "reason-
ableness" or "abuse of rights" ... do, and are bound to, differ widely. What to
the one party is an abuse is to the other the reassertion of a long withheld "natu-
ral" right. It is therefore in the individualizing application of such guideposts by
impartial arbiters to concrete and unique situations that such principles as eq-
uity or abuse of rights can contribute to the evolution of a new balance of rights
and duties in many fields of international law."
In some contexts, this process may lead to the development of sub-principles, such as
the neighbour principle, that render the more general principle of abuse of rights re-
dundant there."' And as Lowe explains, abuse of rights could play this and other roles
even if it were not itself a positive rule of international law."' One such way is by reaf-
firming, through its very invocation and application, that the rights of states are no
longer general and primordial. With time, this reaffirmation could contribute to
changing how people, both within the discipline of international law and without,
think about states, their rights, and perhaps even the very character of international
law.'" The end result could well be new positive rules of international law directed at
the very same goals.
176 See Kiss, Droit international de l'environnement, supra note 78. For the beginnings of greater
specificity, see especially the Asbestos Case, supra note 126 at paras. 8.160ff.
' W. Friedmann, "The Uses of 'General Principles' in the Development of International Law"
(1963) 57 A.J.I.L. 279 at 289-90 [footnotes omitted]. See also Handl, supra note 86 at 57.
'
76 See discussion above, Part IV.
1 See Part V above. Ian Brownlie writes, "[lt may be said that the doctrine is a useful agent in the
progressive development of the law, but that, as a general principle, it does not exist in positive law."
Supra note 136 at 448. See also B.D. Smith, State Responsibility and the Marine Environment (Ox-
ford: Clarendon Press, 1988) at 85: "When international law defines conduct as wrongful it is by ref-
erence to rules, such as the obligation to prevent environmental harm, which may reflect the logic of
abuse of rights; it is not, however, by recourse to the abstraction of abuse of rights itself.'
'o Recent international relations literature on "constructivism" is of some relevance here. See e.g.
J.G. Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization (London:
Routledge, 1998); A. Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1999); J. Brunnie & S. Toope, "International Law and Constructivism: Elements of an In-
teractional Theory of International Law" (2000) 39 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 19.
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Conclusion
This article argues that abuse of rights is a long-standing general principle of law
that continues to play an important role in certain limited contexts by imposing re-
strictions on, or mediating between, state rights otherwise characterized as general or
primordial. Within national legal systems, each actor's rights are necessarily limited
by the rights and interests of others. Thanks in part to the principle of abuse of rights,
the same holds true in international law.
The principle also plays a role in the promotion of legal change. In an interna-
tional society that itself continues to experience rapid and far-reaching change, long-
standing general principles of law such as abuse of rights help to extend legal controls
to previously unregulated areas, and to fill new gaps as they appear. As international
lawyers rush forward to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century, they would be
wise not to leave abuse of rights, one of their most basic tools, behind.
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